Chapter 23

Daniel Everett on Pirahã Syntax

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Daniel Everett’s syntactic observations about the Brazilian indigenous language Pirahã (Current Anthropology 46[4], 2005) provoked not just linguistic dispute but also a lengthy campaign of vilification. This paper cites a dozen specific actions Everett’s opponents have taken, clearly aimed not at clarification but at damaging his reputation and obstructing his research. His opponents voice not only empirical and conceptual linguistic objections but also allegations of dishonesty and even racism. The seeds of the dispute lie in sentence complexity: in effect, whether Pirahã syntax can support an argument for sentence length being unbounded. It should not have surprised linguists to see a negative answer: the prior literature contains such claims for other languages. The arguments that Everett’s opponents present for what they call “recursion” in Pirahã that range from inconclusive to incompetent. It is very likely that Everett is empirically correct. The unjustified attacks on his integrity and career do a major injustice to the most important living scholar of Amazonian languages.

1 Everett’s dangerous idea

The war on Daniel Everett’s reputation and research began soon after the fall of 2005, when he gave a two-part language tutorial session on the Brazilian indigenous language Pirahã at the annual meeting of the Linguistics Association of Great Britain in Cambridge, England (September 1–2), and published an article entitled “Cultural constraints on grammar and cognition in Pirahã” in the August-October issue of Current Anthropology (CA). The publisher of CA, the University of Chicago Press, put out a news release about the article which led to some newspaper stories. The surprising result was that in the following years Everett was subjected to bitter attacks impugning not just his work but his integrity and
character. The attacks emerged first within the linguistics community, but have come to the attention of a much wider public, particularly among admirers of Noam Chomsky.

The Pirahã are an uncompromisingly independent tribe of indigenous Amazonian Indians living a subsistence-level low-technology lifestyle on the banks of the Maici river in Amazonas state. They hardly interact with mainstream Brazilian society at all. They show no interest in reading, writing, counting, history, politics, or religion.

Their language appears unrelated to any other now spoken, and they have remained resolutely monolingual in it for at least 200 years, despite occasional contacts with other indigenous people, and acquaintance with three generations of American missionaries, and sporadic and superficial contacts with mainstream Brazilian river traders. A very small number of Pirahã men have a smattering of Portuguese and can act as interlocutors for Pirahã villages that do come into contact with Portuguese-speaking Brazilian river traders. Sakel (2012) calls them “gatekeepers”, and provides some interesting data on their very rudimentary Portuguese (she also notes some use of a local pidgin based on the Tupian language Nheengatu). But the women speak only Pirahã, and the gatekeepers basically shelter the vast majority of the Pirahã community (including most of the men) from needing even a minimal competence in Portuguese.

The language is linguistically unusual in several ways, from its tiny phonemic system and unusual phonology to its complete absence of numerals and pure color terms. But although Everett’s statements on these points raised some linguists’ eyebrows, they did not provoke anger. What did, and what motivated the surprising events described in Section §2 below, was sentence structure. This might seem an unlikely trigger for angry diatribes and libelous allegations (at least for anyone who did not know the history of generative syntax chronicled in Harris 2021).

It is highly relevant that all production of Pirahã is oral: though an orthography has been devised, no member of the community has shown any interest in learning to read or write. And oral discourse in the language shows no signs of such familiar syntactic phenomena or devices that writers use in constructing long sentences. Everett reports that there are no signs of no multiple coordination (It takes [skill, nerve, initiative, and courage], complex determiners ([[[my] son’s] wife’s] family), stacked modifiers (a [nice, [cosy, [inexpensive [little cottage]]]]),

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1See Dobrin & Schwartz 2021 for an interesting discussion of the ways in which knowledge is based in fieldwork, and how differing assumptions about things like how to devise glosses contributed to the conflict between Everett and his critics on the quantifier issue.
or – most significant of all – reiterable clause embedding (*I thought [ you already knew [ that she was here ] ]*). These are the primary constructions that in English permit sentences of any arbitrary finite length to be constructed, yielding the familiar argument that the set of all definable grammatical sentences in English is infinite.  

Linguists versed in syntactic typology were not the ones who expressed shock at the syntactic facts: similar claims had long been made about other languages, sparking no particular controversy. The anthropologist Brent Berlin, commenting on the CA paper (p. 635, one of eight invited responses published with the article) expresses no surprise about the absence of subordination, and quotes a remark by Foley (1986: 177) about the Papuan language Iatmul, where “Linking of clauses is at the same structural level rather than as part within whole.”

The late Kenneth Hale (1934–2001), a long-time MIT faculty member, argued as early as the mid 1970s that the Australian language Warlpiri could not even be said to have phrase structure, which would necessarily entail it did not have syntactically subordinate clauses. Hale’s work, together with that of R. M. W. Dixon, founded a rich subdiscipline of work on Australian languages, particularly the Pama-Nyungan family. The literature is too rich for a proper survey here, but suffice it to say that examination of the example sentences presented in works on Pama-Nyungan languages such as Hale (1976), Nash (1980), Dixon (1981), Austin & Bresnan (1996), and Pensalfini (2004), one finds no sign of any embedded complement clauses. Sentences seem to consist solely of word-level constituents, word order often being astonishingly free. There are signs of what might be non-finite secondary predications at main clause margins which could perhaps be called “functionally dependent” but “structurally unembedded” as Austin & Bresnan (1996: 228, esp. n.13) suggest, but there is none of the clause subordination familiar from English and other languages of the sort Whorf called “Standard Average European”.

But there is far more relevant literature than just the work on Pama-Nyungan. More than four decades ago the syntactic typology specialist Talmy Givón (1979: 298) wrote in very general terms about languages of “preindustrial, illiterate societies with relatively small, homogeneous social units” in which “subordination does not really exist”. Kalmár (1985: esp. pp.157–159), citing Givón, elaborates further, giving several earlier references and raising the interesting possibility

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2The soundness of the argument even for English can be questioned: Pullum & Scholz (2010: 115–124) argue that the claim of an actually infinite number of sentences cannot be sustained. But we can set that theoretical point aside here, concentrating on matters like whether the language permits embedding of clauses within clauses.
that Canadian Inuktitut is in the process of developing subordinate clauses for
the first time in writing on serious subjects.

Mithun (1984) studies the noticeable avoidance of subordination in highly ag-
glutinative languages employing polysynthesis in their verb structures. She fo-
cuses on Gunwinggu (=Kunwinjku, citing 1951 and 1964 sources), Kathlamet
(from a 1911 source), and Mohawk (from her own contemporary informant work),
and observes that they all resist resorting to subordination, some almost com-
pletely. Evans & Levinson (2009: Section 6) take the view that quite generally
in Bininj Kun-wok (of which Kunwinjku can be regarded as a dialect variant)
there is no clausal embedding, and morphological embedding is possible only
to one degree. They also note (p. 442) that Kayardild (another Pama-Nyungan
language) allow subordination, “but caps it at one level of nesting”: the subordi-
nation cannot be employed to put clauses inside clauses inside clauses and thus
make sentences arbitrarily long.

Mithun (1984: 509) offers an interesting conjecture about why even one-level
subordination is avoided in such languages: in oral-only languages it should per-
haps not be seen as implying any shortcoming or lack on their part, but rather an
indication that once languages are written, the necessarily slower composition
and reception of the written form leads to the development of new syntactic tools
“to compensate for the loss of mechanisms inherent in skillful oratory” such as
intonational phrasing.

Many other instances could be cited of linguists commenting long before 2005
on languages in which arbitrary sentence extensibility seems not to be possible.
And not just languages of hunter-gatherer cultures but also languages of early
antiquity in Europe and Asia: comments about the lack of true hypotaxis can be
found in literature on early Akkadian, Old Chinese, Homeric Greek, and Proto-
Uralic.

The late Wayne O’Neil (1931–2020), an MIT faculty member like Hale, pub-
lished a paper in 1977 arguing that early Old English also showed no signs of
clause embedding. Writers would just tack an additional clauses on the end of a
main clause, very loosely attached (very much as in Pama-Nyungan). Once Old
English speakers were able “to take advantage of the leisure for the composition
and decomposition of sentences that being able to read and write afforded them”,
O’Neil says, “they took advantage of it in the simplest possible way ... by simply
adjoining sentences to sentences, sometimes without even deleting the shared
nominal” (1977: 210). The implication is that before Old English was written, sub-
ordination was basically absent from the language.

The claims referenced in the last half-dozen paragraphs may or may not be
correct in their detailed analytical claims; I am not trying to evaluate them here.
My point is merely that they provide descriptions of languages in which it looks as if it would not be possible to construct sentences of arbitrary length, and they have been sitting uncontroversially on library shelves for decades. It is peculiar that things changed so dramatically in 2005, and that the reaction was so extreme, given that Everett was merely making a point about Pirahã that had been repeatedly made before about other languages.

What had changed? The answer is that a paper co-authored by Marc Hauser, Noam Chomsky, and W. Tecumseh Fitch had been published in the prestigious general scientific journal *Science*: *Hauser* et al. (2002), henceforth HCF. The paper contains a lot of evolutionary biology and zoology, and it is reasonable to assume that the first-named author did most of the writing. Fitch was an associate in Hauser’s lab at Harvard, and Chomsky may have been added as a co-signatory rather than working in detail on the paper’s content (this attributional matter is not irrelevant in the light of the findings of scientific misconduct against Hauser five years later; see footnote 10 below).

HCF included an informally phrased conjecture about what Chomsky calls “Universal Grammar” (UG). The conjecture was that the sole aspect of linguistic structure attributable to a biologically rooted “faculty of language in the narrow sense”, unique to *Homo sapiens*, is a special cognitive capacity for unbounded combining of mental syntactic representations through repeated applications of a posited binary set-formation operation called “Merge”. To motivate this idea for a general scientific readership, HCF pointed to a putatively self-evident fact about human language (p. 1571):

> The core property of discrete infinity is intuitively familiar to every language user... There is no longest sentence (any candidate sentence can be trumped by, for example, embedding it in “Mary thinks that ...”), and there is no non-arbitrary upper bound to sentence length. In these respects, language is directly analogous to the natural numbers ...

Notice the phrase “every language user”, which suggests we are talking about every language of biologically normal human beings anywhere on earth. Note

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3HCF and a voluminous subsequent literature discusses these matters in terms of “recursion”. I will avoid the use of this term (which HCF nowhere defines) because linguists’ use of it is a morass of confusion, as Lobina (2014) correctly points out. In mathematical logic, “recursion” refers to either definition by induction or computational routines that invoke themselves (Soare 1996, esp. 286–289), and “recursive” is used of sets to mean “decidable”. Linguists use “recursion” to refer either to self-embedding in phrase structure, or to iterated application of the “Merge” operation, or to HCF’s conjectured mental syntactic combinatory capacity, and they use “recursive” as a predicate of rules or grammars. I focus instead on the relatively clear issue of what kinds of expressions the grammar permits.
also HCF’s claim that the human “faculty of language in the narrow sense” must “construct an infinite array of internal expressions from the finite resources of the conceptual-intentional system” (p. 1578).

The content of the quotations above are entirely in line with Chomskyan ideas, though it is plausible to assume that Hauser drafted much of the article’s text. The claims in HCF simply restate more emphatically a view that stemmed from Chomsky’s earliest work and had been standard fare in linguistics textbooks for decades. Nearly half a century before, Chomsky (1956: 113) had claimed that the key purpose of a grammar was to project a finite corpus “to an infinite set of grammatical sentences”, and over the next decade this became a part of the usual motivation for generative grammar. Ronald Langacker (1968: 31), for example, was merely elaborating on it when he wrote that “The set of well-formed sentences in English is infinite, and the same is true of every other language”, adding the standard argument that given a sentence of any length you can construct a longer one by embedding it as a that-clause. HCF was merely echoing such statements.

Two years before HCF, Lasnik (2000: 3) had put things even more assertively in a syntax textbook, calling the availability of infinitely many sentences a “central” universal of language:

Infinity is one of the most fundamental properties of human languages, maybe the most fundamental one. People debate what the true universals of language are, but indisputably, infinity is central.

And six months before Everett’s CA article was published, Sam Epstein and Norbert Hornstein (2005) cited HCF in a letter (intended for publication in Science but published in Language instead) defending the Chomskyan program and asserting that “human language is a highly structured formal combinatorial system and, in addition, the number of discrete well-formed sentences generated by the system is infinite.” They continued (p. 4):

This property of discrete infinity characterizes EVERY human language; none consists of a finite set of sentences. The unchanged central goal of linguistic theory over the last fifty years has been and remains to give a precise, formal characterization of this property and then to explain how humans develop (or grow) and use discretely infinite linguistic systems. [Emphasis in original – GKP.]

This differs from earlier claims only in being even more strident and explicit.

The trouble for Everett was that by the mid 2000s, endorsing HCF’s view of the biological basis of language had become something of a test of loyalty to the
Chomskyan mainstream conception of syntax. Everett’s simple descriptive observation (with its many precedents in unnoticed earlier literature) had become an ideologically dangerous idea.

Some attempts were made to answer it by reinterpreting HCF in a way that could allow Everett’s claims to be true without being relevant. The tactic is to neutralize the dangerous idea by asserting that only a vastly weaker hypothesis was ever really at issue. The main attack on Everett in the refereed literature, Nevins et al. (2009c), briefly mentions such a reinterpretation, claiming that under theories of the sort HCF assumed, “what is at stake is in fact the general ability to build phrases that contain phrases as subparts” and nothing more (pp. 366–67, fn. 11). This retrospectively interprets HCF as saying merely that phrases may contain other phrases. That must involve Merge applying to objects formed by Merge, and that can be called “recursion”, vindicating HCF.

There are two problems, though. First, HCF’s actual claim about languages was never simply that some phrases can contain certain other phrases (which could be entirely compatible with an upper bound on sentence length). The reference to a literal infinity of sentences quoted above (“There is no longest sentence”) is crystal clear. Second, the notion that phrases may contain other phrases is absurdly weak: no one ever doubted it, and no one could think it merited publication in *Science*.

Chomsky has nonetheless essayed a retreat to an even weaker thesis (or at least a less empirically accessible one), which does not say anything about languages at all. He has maintained in various interviews that HCF was merely suggesting that there was a genetically inherited mental capacity of our species that *would* permit humans to learn languages with arbitrary sentence length, *if* they chose to use it. Whether or not speakers of attested languages show signs of using it is, Chomsky now claims, a total irrelevance. Speaking to a 2016 interviewer, Chomsky stated that we can dismiss the evidence of Pirahã syntax because “if some tribe were found in which people wear a patch over one eye and hence do not use binocular vision, it would tell us nothing at all about the human faculty of vision.”

Hornstein (2019: 792–794) expounds this view at greater length idea for anyone who didn’t get the memo the first time. He distinguishes “Greenberg universals”, to which evidence about languages can be relevant, from “Chomsky universals”, which apparently await future advances in neurophysiology for support or refutation. Unfortunately, putting it this way reduces to nothing more than saying

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vii
that there must be some special combinatorial ability (HCF’s “faculty of language in the narrow sense”) built into our brains somehow. The view makes no testable predictions except that some sort of linguistic ability will exist in normal humans; but we knew that when we arrived at the lab.

In the interview with Filomena Sorrentino mentioned above, Chomsky makes an additional revealing remark. Sorrentino asked him, “Is there something especially interesting about the Pirahã language?”, and he said:

The interesting properties of Pirahã have been studied in depth for many years in a wide range of languages, most prominently by Everett’s mentor, MIT linguist Kenneth Hale, one of the leading figures in the study of indigenous languages, who has produced many important studies of these topics from the 1960s.

There are some straightforward untruths here – Chomsky’s MIT colleague Kenneth Hale, though admired by Everett and everyone else who knew him, never served as “Everett’s mentor”, since Everett’s MA and PhD theses on Pirahã had been completed before the two men met, and Hale never worked on Pirahã at all – but notice that Chomsky seems to be acknowledging the existence of a language with no apparent syntactic embedding. As mentioned above, Hale did point out in the 1970s that Warlpiri lent no support to any theory of hierarchical constituent structure, which would imply the absence of subordinate clause constituents, and at that time Chomsky saw no reason to attack him for it. It was only his pique at seeing HCF contradicted that motivated his going on the offensive against Everett.

**Everett (2005)** was really just drawing the attention of syntactic theorists to a pre-existing conflict. For decades linguists had been drawing motivation for generative grammars from the proposition that all human languages had infinite numbers of grammatical sentences. Pirahã provides a particularly clear and much publicized case of a language lacking the key syntactic constructions that could support the truth of such claims. For those aggressively committed to the totality of Chomsky’s program, especially those knowing little of the syntactic literature from two or three decades earlier, this message had to be addressed by attacking the messenger.

The public part of the war on Everett began with a long paper about his work first circulated in 2007 and ultimately published by *Language* in 2009. It was written by David Pesetsky of MIT, Andrew Nevins, then at Harvard (now University College London), and Cilene Rodrigues, then at Emmanuel College, Boston (now the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro). I will refer to this trio as NP&R.
NP&R’s paper (Nevins et al. 2009c) contains lengthy discussion of a topic about which I will say hardly anything: the extent to which, and the ways in which, culture can influence grammar. Everett holds that a single feature of Pirahã cultural life – their focus on immediate experience rather than remote considerations like the distant past, the far future, or the abstractions of mathematics or philosophy – predicts a whole slew of properties of their language. I doubt it, as do NP&R. But it is not their disagreeing with Everett that I will be concerned with here. In Section 3 I will turn to the rather meager results of their search for false syntactic claims in Everett (2005), but first I review some of the ancillary actions they and others took, and the way they instigated and promoted a remarkably vicious attack on Everett’s character and integrity in the years that followed. I will survey the events only briefly in the next section, without attempting to be exhaustive.

2 Character assassination and career disruption

The obvious course of action for linguists who felt Everett’s CA paper must be mistaken would have been to engage with him collaboratively to find out more about relevant properties of the Pirahã language. This was not the path chosen by NP&R. Their paper was written without contact with either Everett or anyone else who knew the Pirahã language. This made it wholly an exercise in textual exegesis. And it did not stop at addressing factual claims; it contained thinly veiled inferences and accusations of prejudice, dishonesty, and even misconduct.

The suggestion NP&R made was in essence that Everett’s early descriptive writings on Pirahã did offer evidence of subordinate clauses, so his 2005 position was a suspiciously unsupported and possibly mendacious retraction of earlier views.

Despite their mention of the idea that HCF had only ever intended a weak claim about phrases containing other phrases (pp. 366–67, fn. 11), that was only minor point made in passing; their central aim was to argue that in 2005 Everett was simply not telling the truth about clausal embedding, and that one could learn this by simply looking at his work of a quarter-century before, where he did tell the truth. In a refereed paper for Language they could only adumbrate the claim of dishonesty, but in less constrained channels they and others were less guarded: emails, tweets, blogs, remarks to journalists, and posts on Facebook can slip the surly bonds of scholarly decency.

The attack mounted by NP&R, and taken up by other anti-Everett linguists, was not the worst that a social scientist ever suffered; the libeling of anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon and geneticist James Neel by Patrick Tierney (2000) was
Geoffrey K. Pullum

surely worse. But the trashing of Daniel Everett runs a fair second for nastiness. Tom Bartlett of *The Chronicle of Higher Education* heard about it from linguists that he interviewed in 2012. His account of linguists’ behavior (Bartlett 2012) is not edifying, but fully accords with my knowledge and experience of the events. He speaks of a linguistics discipline “populated by a deeply factionalized group of scholars who can’t agree on what they’re arguing about and who tend to dismiss their opponents as morons or frauds or both.” Other disciplines have disputes too, he admits, but even so, “linguists seem uncommonly hostile.” If anything, Bartlett somewhat understated things; the following subsections mention documentable incidents that he did not even mention.

### 2.1 Initial cancelation attempt

In the fall of 2006 Professor Edward Gibson arranged for Daniel Everett to give a lecture on Pirahã syntax in the Brain and Cognitive Sciences department at MIT. David Pesetsky, of MIT’s Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, contacted him and urged him to rescind the invitation. Everett should not come to MIT, Pesetsky insisted. Gibson asked why, and as part of his argument Pesetsky cited evidence from a website suggesting that Everett held racist views.

Gibson assured Pesetsky on the basis of long personal acquaintance (having known Everett when they were both at the University of Pittsburgh) that Everett was no racist, and asked what specific evidence he had for thinking otherwise. Pesetsky told Gibson that Everett had a web page on which he had said that the Pirahã talk like chickens and act like monkeys.

Gibson knew the quotation. It came from a page headed “Pirahã: The People” on a University of Pittsburgh site. In 2007 it was still accessible. It reported a contemptuous remark by Brazilian merchants who traveled the Maici river and occasionally traded with men from Pirahã villages. Everett wrote that “The local traders say they “talk like chickens and act like monkeys”.” He was not endorsing that characterization; he despised the racist ignorance of the people who made the remark. Gibson pointed that out, but Pesetsky remained obdurate, insisting

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5 Tierney falsely alleged that Chagnon and Neel had deliberately exacerbated a fatal measles epidemic among the Yanomamö people in pursuit of some kind of eugenics experiment. For a time anthropologists Leslie Sponsel and Terence Turner persuaded the American Anthropological Association to support these charges and condemn Chagnon and Neel. See Dreger 2011 for detailed research on the whole sordid story of this affair, and a vindication of Chagnon and Neel. Tierney is now regarded as totally discredited.

6 Its location was [http://amazonling.linguist.pitt.edu/people.html](http://amazonling.linguist.pitt.edu/people.html) but it did not survive Everett’s subsequent moves to other universities and seems not to have been preserved by the Wayback Machine site.
that Everett was an unsuitable person to be given a podium at MIT. Gibson finally
told him that the matter was closed: the invitation stood, and the lecture would
take place as planned.

Despite Gibson’s pointing out that an unendorsed direct quotation could not
be used to infer Everett’s views, the first draft of NP&R’s paper, circulated several
months later, contained a statement that the authors felt a “general discomfort
with the overall presentation of Pirahã language and culture” that Everett gave,
and added a footnote (p. 51, fn. 74) that repeated the quote from the river traders.

My information about this private exchange comes from conversations with
Gibson. Pesetsky told Gibson not to circulate the emails they exchanged, and
Gibson respected that wish, so I have not seen them. What is significant is that
the allegations about Everett holding racially denigratory views about indigen-
ous Brazilians was not a misunderstanding emerging later among uninformed
discussants of NP&R’s paper; it was a charge used by Pesetsky as a pretext for
trying to deplatform Everett months before the paper was completed. Represent-
ing Everett as holding racially denigratory views, and attempting to deny him
forums for talking about his work, was part of NP&R’s campaign right from the
start.

2.2 Lecture boycott attempt

On Tuesday 28 November 2006, Gibson put out a formal announcement of the
lecture by Everett by an email to the mailing lists for linguists and BCS people
at MIT and Harvard. Immediately Andrew Nevins (who had never met Everett,
and refused to do so when Gibson later invited him to) sent out a scathing attack
email from his Harvard account to the same lists, urging everyone to boycott
the talk. The flavor is conveyed by the sarcastic advertising copy with which he ended:

You, too, can enjoy the spotlight of mass media and closet exoticists! Just find a remote
tribe and exploit them for your own fame by making claims nobody will bother to check!

It was shocking to see this intrusion into linguistic science of the sort of attack
ads normally seen in politics. I said as much in a Language Log post, speculating
on whether prejudice against missionaries had something to do with the attack.

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8 I was on the Harvard list at the time, so I was a recipient. Nevins tried to reach the MIT Brain
and Cognitive Sciences list as well as the lists for the two linguistics departments, but found it
closed to external senders.
9 http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/003837.html
But the effect of the attempted boycott was probably to advertise the talk more widely, for it took place to an unusually large audience. Nevins, Pesetsky, and Rodrigues all attended, abandoning their own proposed boycott. Marc Hauser, the later disgraced lead author of HCF, was also there (he was well acquainted with Nevins, who attended Hauser’s lab meetings at the time).  

2.3 Research permit ban

Cilene Rodrigues, the third author of the NP&R paper, who also has never met Everett in person, had more aggressive plans for damaging Everett’s reputation and career. One day in 2007 Everett received a phone call from the distinguished journalist Larry Rohter, who had been South American bureau chief for The New York Times since 1999. Rohter was in the office of the president of FUNAI (Fundação Nacional do Índio, later renamed Fundação Nacional dos Povos Indígenas), the Brazilian government agency charged with overseeing the welfare and protection of the country’s indigenous people. In his hands was a letter written to FUNAI by Cilene Rodrigues. Rohter read the Portuguese text to Everett over the phone. It expressed objections to Everett’s linguistic research and his representation of Pirahã culture, and made the case that he was not a suitable person to be permitted to work with Brazilian Indians.  

Napoleon Chagnon’s enemies had done something similar to him a few years earlier, writing to FUNAI to say that he should be banned from visiting the Yanomamö people in Brazil. The tactic worked in both cases (and it is easy to see why it might: angry Brazilian linguists and anthropologists constitute a real local problem for a FUNAI bureaucrat, much more so than a disappointed foreign permit applicant far away). FUNAI did indeed decide to bar Everett from

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10 Nevins was at an informal talk I gave at one of Hauser’s lab meetings at Harvard in January 2006. Seven months after Nevins’s email about “claims nobody will bother to check”, in July 2007, Harvard investigators began to check Hauser’s claims about primate behavior. They entered his lab while he was away, and seized computers, video records, and documents. By August 2010 they had found him “solely responsible” for “eight instances of scientific misconduct”, including “problems involving data acquisition, data analysis, data retention, and the reporting of research methodologies and results.” After a year’s leave of absence, Hauser learned that he would not be allowed to return to teaching at Harvard, or maintain a laboratory, or apply for grants. He resigned effective 1 August 2011. Later a separate investigation by the federal government’s Office of Research Integrity found in September 2012 that he had fabricated data, manipulated results, and wrongly described experiments supported by several federal grants (see DHSS notice 77 FR 54917, 09/06/2012). Gross (2011) provides a detailed discussion of the Harvard investigation and its aftermath.

Pirahã’s reserved territory (which, ironically, he had originally assisted FUNAI in demarcating, to protect the Pirahãs’ right to their land). When he next applied to visit the Pirahã with a research team including Gibson, he found that he could not get a permit.

Having permanent resident status in Brazil, he was later able to visit the area as an aide to a film team during the making of the 2012 documentary film *The Grammar of Happiness*, but his applications to do grant-supported field research on the language were denied.

Everett flew to Brasília to discuss the ban, accompanied by the doyen of Amazonian research, the late Aryon Rodrigues (1925–2014), who had been a mentor to him during his doctoral studies. They had set up a meeting with the president of FUNAI, Márcio Meira, but Meira did not show up. Instead he sent a former president as his deputy, but did not deputize him to make executive decisions. Everett’s enemies had thus succeeded in putting an end to his fieldwork with the Pirahã, and severing his connection to people he had known intimately for more than thirty years. Among other things, this was a material loss for the Pirahã, because every time Everett arrived in their village he would bring medicines and other valued items.

### 2.4 Chomsky’s “charlatan” insult

In early 2009 Noam Chomsky was interviewed about the dispute by *Folha de S. Paulo*, the the largest-circulation newspaper in Brazil, and with evident irritation he told the interviewer (see the issue of 1 February 2009):

> Ele virou um charlatão puro, embora costumava ser um bom linguista descritivo. É por isso que, até onde eu sei, todos os linguistas sérios que trabalham com línguas brasileiras ignoram-no.

[“He became a pure charlatan, although he used to be a good descriptive linguist. That is why, as far as I know, all the serious linguists who work on Brazilian languages ignore him.”]

The petty abuse of the first clause is followed by straightforward dishonesty: Chomsky has never worked on Brazilian indigenous languages and has never dis-

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12 On YouTube at [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5NyB4fIZHeU](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5NyB4fIZHeU) and also via SLICE at [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_lar6eiiVtY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_lar6eiiVtY)

13 Everett actually lived in Pirahã villages for 10 days in 1977; 3 weeks in 1978; 6 weeks in 1979; 8 months in 1980; 4 months each year from 1981 to 1985; a total of 12 months during 1986–1988; a total of 36 months during 1989–1999; 20 months during 1999–2001; and 3 months during 2001–2009, a total of just over 100 months.
cussed any detailed work by those who have. He does not know the wider community of Amazonianists (many of them missionaries, others secular linguists in a variety of universities in Europe and the Americas), and therefore has no grounds for estimating Everett’s standing among Amazonianists. The truth is that Everett’s expertise has never been questioned by the missionary linguists among whom he used to work, or by any of the roughly twenty researchers who have spent time with him among the Pirahã or collaborated with him on research, or by any of the few outsiders who have actually made progress on learning the Pirahã language.

Worse, Chomsky then went on to make a clearly unverifiable claim about Everett’s private thoughts and hopes:

Everett espera que os leitores não entendam a deferença entre a GU no sentido técnico (a teoria do componente genético da linguagem humana) e no sentido informal, que dis respeito às propriedades comuns a todas as línguas.

[“Everett hopes that the readers do not understand the difference between UG in the technical sense (the theory of the genetic component of human language) and the informal sense, which concerns properties common to all languages.”]

Chomsky is alluding to his reinterpretation of HCL’s “recursion” claims as having never been about languages, but only about the genetically transmitted human ability to acquire language. He is claiming that Everett wanted to pull the wool over the eyes of CA readers – to fool them into paying attention to sentence structure when really he knew the focus should have been on genetics and neurophysiology. But HCF never provided any genetic or neurophysiological facts about the human language capacity that Everett could have focused on. As Everett noted in a response to NP&R, if the “genetic component” is the issue on the table, then Chomsky’s claim seems virtually empty: humans simply have whatever special thing it is that permits them to acquire and use language (see Everett 2009: 439). Since he was motivated by what HCL actually said (“There is no longest sentence”, etc.), he concentrated on “properties common to all languages.” That isn’t charlatanry.

2.5 Overt accusation of racism

Later in 2009, Rodrigues increased the rhetorical temperature some more. She explicitly alleged in a magazine interview with the German journalist Malte Henk
that Everett held racist beliefs. She told him: “Everett ist ein Rassist. Er stellt die Pirahã auf eine Stufe mit Primaten” [“Everett is a racist. He puts the Pirahã on a level with primates”]. By “primates” she clearly means apes and monkeys, unless she has forgotten that all humans are primates.

As Bartlett (2012) remarks, “When you read Everett’s two books about the Pirahã, it is nearly impossible to think that he believes they are inferior. In fact, he goes to great lengths not to condescend.” He does indeed. He stresses their sharp intelligence, ingenuity, strong group identity, rich social life, and ability to grasp complex discourse. He lived with them, hunted with them, raised his three children among them, talked with them endlessly, and learned from them during periods of residence totaling well over eight years. His many accounts of interaction with them (most engagingly in Everett 2008) often evince admiration, and never for a moment suggest he sees them as racially inferior beings.

Where could it have come from, this notion that Everett holds racist beliefs, voiced by someone who has never even met him? The passage quoting the river traders (see Section §2.1) is hardly enough to motivate it. The most charitable assumption I can see would be that it stems from Chomsky’s insistence that generative linguistics is really “biolinguistics”: that descriptive claims about grammar are literally to be seen as biological claims about brain mechanisms. There is nothing scientifically serious that underpins such assertions: neither Chomsky nor anyone else has linked syntactic embedding or iterated modification to anything neurobiological. But perhaps some particularly gullible followers of Chomsky may have reasoned that if a feature that Chomsky regards as utterly fundamental to the human language capacity is being claimed to be absent from the Pirahã language, then its speakers are in effect being depicted as not fully human. Combine that with the modern liberal horror at any derogatory talk at all about minority ethnic groups, and we can imagine that Rodrigues might have believed what she told Malte Henk.

A less charitable guess would be that she was cynically turning things up a notch with a more strident assertion of what NP&R had been trying to suggest since the fall of 2006. An accusation of racism, whether there are grounds for it or not, is a more potent weapon in contemporary intellectual and political debate than any syntactic reanalysis.

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15 In an email to Everett, Rodrigues denied ever making the remark, but Malte Henk stands by his claim about what she said to him on the record; see Everett (2013: 13).
2.6 Fraud libels

When Tom Bartlett asked Nevins for a comment about the war on Everett for his 2012 article, Nevins refused to be interviewed, but emailed back: “it seems you’ve already analyzed this kind of case!” – and appended a link to an earlier Bartlett story about Diederik Stapel.

The implied defamatory claim here is extreme. Stapel is famously an admitted fraudster. He voluntarily returned his PhD certificate to the University of Amsterdam because he acknowledged that his scientific misconduct had been “inconsistent with the duties associated with the doctorate”. So far 58 of his papers in social psychology (often with innocent co-authors) have been retracted on grounds that the data were either manipulated or – in at least 30 cases – simply invented out of thin air. Stapel would invent whole tables of data with no empirical basis at all, and published many reports of experimental studies that were never conducted. Nevins is equating Everett’s many years of immersive fieldwork and data analysis with the proven scientific misconduct of a man described in The New York Times (26 April 2013) as “the biggest con man in academic science”.

At the time Nevins sent his message to Bartlett, Everett was a dean at Bentley University and happened to be busy chairing an investigation into allegations against a professor of accounting: Professor James E. Hunton, who ultimately resigned in December 2012. By 2016 at least 37 of Hunton’s papers had been retracted under suspicions of wholesale invention of data and publishing reports of studies that had never been conducted. Bentley, therefore, had a well-functioning procedure for dealing with research misconduct, which could have been used against Everett if anyone had come up with a scintilla of evidence about fraud or other research misconduct.

Tom Roeper of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, also directly and publicly accused Everett of fraud. Speaking about Everett on camera to the makers of The Grammar of Happiness, he said: “I think he knows he’s wrong, that’s what I really think.” With a knowing smile, he added: “I think it’s a move that many, many intellectuals make to get a little bit of attention.” Roeper’s claim is not just that Everett is wrong, but that he knows he’s wrong, and is telling lies “to get a little bit of attention.”

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16 See Retraction Watch, https://retractionwatch.com/2016/05/12/former-accounting-prof-adds-4-more-retractions-total-exceeds-37/
17 For a bookmarked location of Roeper’s remark in the SLICE release of the film, retitled as “Decoding Amazon: life of the Pirahã”, go to https://youtu.be/_LAR6eeiVtY?t=1323
2.7 Illegality accusations

In Brazil, the allegations went further than simply positing dishonesty. Rumors were spread that Everett had been working illegally, neglecting to obtain the required permits for working in Indian areas. Denny Moore, an American linguist resident in Brazil, made forceful allegations along these lines to me, on the record (personal conversation and subsequent email, May 2019).

Moore alleges that Everett had never complied with the full legal requirements, but this is implausible on its face, because if it were true then the FUNAI ban would have had no force. Everett long ago acquired permanent resident status in Brazil, so he can visit the country whenever he wishes. But visiting the Pirahã reservation to do research on their language without a FUNAI permit would be illegal.

Given the crucial necessity for him to have access throughout his career to indigenous Amazonian areas, one would naturally expect him to comply with the law’s demands, both when he was a government-approved missionary and bible translator (1977), and when he was a linguistics graduate student after FUNAI banned missionary work in Indian areas (1978–1983), and later when he was doing grant-supported research as a faculty member at the University of Pittsburgh (1988–1999) or the University of Manchester (2001–2006). The FUNAI ban has only been effective in preventing him from doing further fieldwork because of his strict compliance with Brazilian law.

Everett does not seem to be a wanted man: he was in Brazil giving lectures in May 2019, and again as recently as April 2023, but no attempt was made to arrest him. There was one occasion in 2006 when four heavily armed policemen did arrive in a Pirahã village where Everett and other researchers were visiting, with orders to investigate charges that he was there without a permit. If he had not been able to show them valid FUNAI authorization they would have arrested him. But as always, he had the appropriate documentation to present. The policemen relaxed and posed for a smiling photo with members of Everett’s team.

2.8 The YouTube video

A conference at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro in 2013 was devoted entirely to work arguing that Everett was wrong. Everett heard about the planning for it, and offered to attend the conference at his own expense, but he was told he would not be welcome. During the same period (August 2013) Nevins took the opportunity to work with Emerson Carvalho and Eva-Maria Rössler to
produce a video18 which seems to have the primary purpose of further damaging Everett’s reputation. It is represented as an interview with two representatives of “the leadership” of the Pirahã (in truth they have no political leaders). The main speaker throughout is Jose Augusto Diarroi, nicknamed “Verão”, who speaks in Portuguese. He falsely represents himself as member of the Pirahã community (his father was Pirahã, but his mother was not, and he was raised elsewhere, never acquiring more than a smattering of the Pirahã language). Sitting beside him is a native Pirahã speaker whose name is given as Yapohen (not a possible Pirahã name) but is actually Hiahoái. Very few Pirahã utterances are heard in the entire interview, and none are glossed in the subtitles.

Augusto tells tales about Everett engaging in activities seemingly drawn from the worst stereotypical charges against bad missionaries, claiming that Everett had terrorized the people he lived among, threatening them that God would kill them all if they did not come to Jesus and convert to being “true believers”. If any of this were true, Augusto would not be one to know it, because he never lived in a Pirahã village during any time when Everett was there.

At some points Augusto attempts to elicit some contributions from Hiahoái, who is visibly reluctant to speak, and says nothing for a long time. When he is eventually prompted to say a few things in Pirahã, Augusto pretends quite unconvincingly to translate them, turning a few seconds of Pirahã into several minutes of Portuguese. What he represents as translations are total fabrications. A version of the video with transcription supertitles of the Pirahã utterances was uploaded by Miguel Salinas in 2019.19 See Everett & Gibson (2019: 781, fn. 3) for brief discussion of some of this video, with examples of the mistranslations.

2.9 Cancelation at Oxford

The work that NP&R have put into representing Everett as a disreputable person and untrustworthy scholar have not had significant material effects on his career: unlike Hauser, he remains a tenured full professor and has served successfully as a department head, dean of arts and sciences, and acting provost. Nevertheless, NP&R have created a kind of folklore, a vague shadow of disrepute, which continues to have effects. Mud sticks, if you throw enough of it. One of Everett’s daughters reports having met people in Brazil who say, “Oh, you’re the daughter of that racist guy.”20 And substantive professional consequences do result from this atmosphere of negativity.

18Online since 2013 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3jWI4cPRMg
19Online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xEAufXg8fc
20Interview with Liz Else and Lucy Middleton, New Scientist, 19 January 2008, p. 44.
For example, on 12 March 2017 Everett offered to give a talk to the linguists at the University of Oxford the following September – at no cost to Oxford because he was planning to visit the UK anyway. The planned lecture would not be about Pirahã syntax, incidentally, but about paleoanthropology and the emergence of language in early humans. His offer was accepted with enthusiasm by the head of the linguistics faculty, Professor Aditi Lahiri, who promptly let her colleagues know the good news. But within hours on the same day her acceptance was withdrawn in a diplomatic but rather awkward message from Lahiri to Everett the same day.

The next day Everett learned the reason: two junior faculty had objected by email as soon as they learned of the tentative plan, citing potential “reputational damage” to Oxford if Everett were to speak there. \(^{21}\) It is hard to know how to make a serious comment on the notion that a visiting speaker could be so toxic that his mere appearance would inflict reputational damage on Britain’s oldest university, often ranked number one in the world. But this is the sort of strange fruit the long campaign against Everett has borne.

### 2.10 The reviews of Recursion Across Domains

The conference in Rio de Janeiro in 2013 resulted in a book entitled *Recursion Across Domains* (Amaral et al. 2018). The central aim of the conference and the book was to publish studies saying Everett was wrong, and he was never invited to submit a reply to its criticisms. But the editors of the Linguistic Society of America’s journal *Language* invited Everett together with his collaborator Edward Gibson to write a review of the book (it appeared as *Everett & Gibson 2019*). When this became known to Everett’s opponents, the editors promptly came under pressure to alter their decision. After some consultation they made the unprecedented decision to give the book two review articles in the same issue. Several potential reviewers who were thought likely to take a more anti-Everett and pro-Chomsky line were sounded out but declined. Finally Norbert Hornstein agreed to take on the task.

Hornstein (2019) admitted with admirable frankness (p. 791) that he knows nothing at all about the empirical content of the book – topics like the syntax of South American languages and experimental developmental psycholinguistics. In fact he says: “Facts usually make me itchy... My allergies will lead me to pass lightly over many of the specific empirical findings in what follows.” His main qualification was clearly that he could be relied upon to support the Chomskyan

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\(^{21}\)This was reported to Everett by Yorick Wilks in an email, 13 March 2017, which I have seen. Wilks stated that he had seen the objectors’ emails.
line, and that he did. (See Section §5 below for a discussion of one chapter from the book that Hornstein naively accepted as sound.)

2.11 Recent literature overviews

The work NP&R have done to damage Everett’s reputation has been ample to color the general impression a newcomer to the dispute will pick up. Aikhenvald (2012), in a superbly detailed survey of Amazonian languages, seems to treat the matter as unfit for discussion, declaring that “there is neither consistency nor plausibility to the quasi-analytical statements which have been made concerning this language [Pirahã], or its culture, during the past fifteen years. I refrain from quoting these sources” (p. 411, n. 91). She thus avoids any discussion of the polemics of the post-2005 literature. In fact she cites nothing on Pirahã dated later than 1986.

Janet Chernela, an anthropologist specializing in Amazonia, recently tried to survey the whole dispute in an article for Annual Review of Anthropology (Chernela 2023). She seems to think she is providing a balanced summary, but her treatment of the relevant literature is hopelessly skewed against Everett. She never even mentions the existence of Handbook of Amazonian Languages, and hence never refers to Everett (1986b), unquestionably the most important descriptive document in the whole dispute. She cites Nevins et al. (2009c) without ever mentioning that it was followed by a detailed response (Everett 2009) in the same issue of Language, nor the rebuttal to that by Nevins et al. (2009a), nor the final rejoinder to that by Everett (2013). She very briefly mentions the incompetently uncritical review article by Hornstein (2019), but seems unaware of the vastly more expert critical one by Everett & Gibson (2019).

I grant that reading all of the post-2005 work just cited would be an exhausting business: anyone who doesn’t come out of reading it feeling dazed and confused just hasn’t been paying attention. But the skewing of Chernela’s coverage is quite extraordinary. It is possible that she fell victim of a major downside to accessing literature online: anyone who had Language 85 no. 2 in their hands could not possibly fail to see that Nevins et al. (2009c) is immediately followed by Everett’s 37-page response, but if Chernela simply heard about the former and downloaded a PDF of it she might well have had no idea the latter existed.

In the matter of the two reviews, however, she has less excuse. She cites Hornstein (2019) (p. 140) only in connection with the hyper-Chomskyan claim that “variation between languages–while possibly interesting for other purposes–is irrelevant to the nature of the FLN.” But if she looked at even the first page she would have seen the editor’s footnote explaining that “This issue of Language
contains two review articles focusing on the volume *Recursion Across Domains,* and adds: “Since the topic of this volume (recursion) is one of central interest (and some controversy) in current linguistic theory, we thought it important to publish reviews from scholars who will bring differing perspectives to the topic”, and so on. She can hardly claim to have accessed the Hornstein article without knowing about the existence of the Everett and Gibson one that immediately precedes it in the same issue.

Chernela makes some patently erroneous claims, citing no basis at all. For example, she says (p. 140) that NP&R “reanalyzed data collected among the Pirahã by Everett’s predecessors”. NP&R did nothing of the sort, and do not try to represent themselves as having done it. Everett’s predecessors failed to get far enough to produce much useful data that NP&R could have used.\(^{22}\)

In an even more inexplicable piece of invention, Chernela asserts (p. 143) that “Much of Everett’s field methodologies involved structured interviews using a recorder” – another completely false claim, based on nothing at all. Everett worked by living in the community and participating in its life. Chernela also asserts that his work “flies in the face of Boasian anthropology” because it fails to “interpret cultures and languages on the basis of each society’s own logic and values rather than through a universal yardstick” and “understand language as a social phenomenon in which meanings cannot be understood apart from context”. But Everett’s work involved interacting more closely with the community than any other outsider has ever done or was ever competent to do, and he strives in all of his work to “interpret cultures and languages on the basis of each society’s own logic and values”. Throughout *Everett (2012)* he stresses that language is intimately linked to culture, and *Everett (2016)* copiously discusses Boas.\(^{23}\)

The pall of negativity and controversy that has been cast over Everett’s work, and the polemical excess in discussions of the topic on the web, may be responsible for some of Chernela’s bias. Like NP&R, she worked without any contact with Everett or anyone else who had ever lived with the Pirahã and learned their language. It was the NYU anthropologist Bambi Schieffelin who suggested to Chernela that she might write the article, and neither of the two people thanked

\(^{22}\)Steven Sheldon, whose residence among the Pirahã antedated Everett’s; did produce some transcribed texts, and those are utilized by *Futrell et al. (2016),* but NP&R do not appear to have known about them. NP&R (2009c: 391) do cite a table of six pronoun forms from a paper by Sheldon, but the paper (Sheldon 1988) appeared two years after Everett’s main descriptive work on the language was in print. The claim that they “reanalyzed data collected among the Pirahã by Everett’s predecessors in the field” is patently false.

\(^{23}\)Chernela mentions the existence of both these books (p. 144), but only in passing, and she misstates the title of the first.
in her acknowledgment note for reading the paper in draft (p. 146) is a linguist. Chernela does no linguistic analysis; she simply browsed some of the recent literature and came away with the broadly negative view of Everett’s work that NP&R have worked so hard to establish as the default.

This is not too surprising an outcome given the intellectual climate that the long campaign of hostilities created. The entire discipline of linguistics should be ashamed of this ghastly parody of science, where rumors of racism substitute for scientific discussion, and political career sabotage replaces rational criticism. But what makes things worse is that it was under-informed from the start. Explaining how and why in the early 1980s Everett attempted to provide evidence of subordination in Pirahā will necessitate a digression into events predating all of his descriptive work, but it is a relevant one.

3 Overlooked prehistory

In 1975, Daniel Everett was 24 and had just completed a Diploma in Foreign Missions from the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago. He and his wife were making plans to enter service as missionaries and bible translators for the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) in South America.

Four thousand miles away, I was a 30-year-old lecturer in linguistics, completing my first year at University College London. I had spent 1973–74 at King’s College, Cambridge, learning typology from Ed Keenan and Bernard Comrie, and spent the summer of 1974 at the LSA Linguistic Institute at U Mass Amherst learning from Chomsky, Halle, Keyser, Perlmutter, and Postal.

In 1976, barely done with writing my PhD dissertation on rule interaction in classical transformational grammar, I was asked if I would take on the supervision of a prospective PhD student: a 54-year-old SIL missionary named Desmond Cyril Derbyshire. He had had no college degree; before he became a missionary he had been a chartered accountant in Durham, England. I’m not sure whether my senior colleagues believed the work of a middle-aged missionary would amount to much, but fortunately for me they allowed him to enroll, and I agreed to be his de facto advisor (de facto because the university did not allow someone of my lowly rank to be a doctoral supervisor). He turned out to be perhaps the finest scholar I ever worked with.

3.1 Discovering Amazonian languages

By the time I met Derbyshire he had done nearly 20 years of work on a Cariban language I had never heard of, spoken on a northern tributary of the Amazon. In
a lecture on constituent-order typology I presented arguments (set out in then-
forthcoming article, Pullum 1977) that there was no convincing evidence for any
language in the world having an object-initial basic constituent order (OVS or
OSV). The only surface orders for the major constituents of the clause permitted
by universal grammar seemed to be SOV as in Hindi, SVO as in English, VSO as
in Irish, and VOS as in Malagasy. Derbyshire raised a hand from the back row
and reported that he had been working on a language that he believed strongly
preferred OVS as the order in transitive clauses.

The language was Hixkaryana. We arranged to meet after class so that I could
learn something about its clausal syntax. Derbyshire had actually published a
preliminary study of it back in 1961, when I was in high school (Derbyshire 1961),
and it included a remark (using the terminology of Kenneth Pike’s largely forgot-
ten tagmemics framework) that “the goal always precedes, and the actor usually
follows, the predicate tagmeme”. In post-Greenberg terms, that meant OVS. But
there had been no discussion of this language in the subsequent literature.

I gave Derbyshire some ideas on how he might confirm that he really was deal-
ing with an OVS language: there was the possibility that (for example) Hixkar-
yana was just an SOV language in which the subject was occasionally shifted to
clause-final position in special discourse contexts. There were substantial stocks
of data to consult: a collection of texts transcribed from native speakers and pub-
lished in Brazil ten years before; a Hixkaryana version of the entire New Tes-
tament, checked throughout by native speaker consultants, in press in Brasilia;
and plentiful supplies of other data collected during Derbyshire’s twenty years of
fieldwork, including a remarkable diary privately composed by a native speaker
who had learned to write the language.

Text from all sources supported Derbyshire to the hilt. My belief that univer-
sal grammar precluded object-initial basic constituent orders was inescapably
wrong. Hixkaryana was a rather rigid OVS language: always OV, with auxil-
ary after the lexical verb, and the subject clause-initial only infrequently, when
specifically focused or contrasted with something else (see Derbyshire 1985: 74).

Derbyshire and I began work on publicizing what appeared to be the then
new and surprising fact that there was definitely at least one clear case of an
OVS language. I worked with Derbyshire on preparing a squib for publication
in Linguistic Inquiry (Derbyshire 1977). And I suggested to him that his doctoral
work might permit him to also undertake a monograph for the Lingua Descrip-
tive Series (LDS) that was being planned by Bernard Comrie and Norval Smith.

The LDS monographs were required to adhere to a format carefully designed
to facilitate comparative research. The instructions for contributors were pub-
lished as a special issue of Lingua (vol. 42, no. 1) as the Lingua Descriptive Series
**Questionnaire** *(Comrie & Smith 1977, henceforth LDSQ)*. It set out a systematic section-numbering scheme for organizing descriptions in the series.

I showed Derbyshire my copy of LDSQ as soon as I received it, and he not only took up the task of writing an LDS monograph, but worked efficiently enough to produce the inaugural one *(Derbyshire 1979)*, a superb description which would have amply justified the award of a PhD – but in fact he also produced a distinct work to offer as his PhD dissertation under the title *Hixkaryana Syntax*, which presented the description somewhat differently and added a second part on typology and discourse syntax plus eleven appendices on phonology and morphology (it was published later as *Derbyshire 1985*).

The significance of LDSQ to this story becomes clear in the light of what its detailed instructions said about subordinate clauses. It specified that Section 1.1.2 of the description was to be headed “Subordination”. Subsection 1.1.2.1 was to state whether there are “any general markers of subordination, e.g. word order, particles (in what position?), verb modification, etc.”, and 1.1.2.2 was to cover “Noun clauses” – the full finite subordinate clauses that Jespersen calls content clauses. Section 1.1.2.2.3 was to deal with declarative content clauses (“indirect statements”), 1.1.2.2.4 was to treat interrogative ones (“indirect questions”), and so on. This had more significance than we then realized.

Derbyshire made some further visits to Brazil and began learning more about what other SIL linguists had found. We began to pick up reports of other OVS languages, plus one or two that seemed to be OSV. I obtained a grant from the UK Social Science Research Council to support Derbyshire’s work, not only on the syntax of Hixkaryana but also on these other reported languages. I learned a lot about the history, geography, ecology, and demography of Amazonia, including about the appalling treatment of its indigenous inhabitants *(Pullum 1978)*, and together Derbyshire and I prepared a paper entitled “Object initial languages” giving brief accounts of a dozen object-initial languages (it was later published in *IJAL* as *Derbyshire & Pullum 1981*). This led to our planning what became the four-volume *Handbook of Amazonian Languages* *(HAL)*.

The relevance of HAL is, of course, that around 1983 or 1984 Derbyshire commissioned a chapter for it from the young Daniel Everett. His grammatical overview of Pirahã became the longest chapter in the first volume *(Derbyshire & Pullum 1986, henceforth HAL 1)*.

Everett was by this time a PhD graduate of the Universidade Estadual de Campinas in Brazil (the first linguistics PhD in the country), with a dissertation on Pirahã grammar and syntactic theory. Derbyshire was aware that Pirahã was a genetically isolated and notoriously difficult language on which SIL had tried to make headway for a quarter of a century. Two previous missionary linguists had...
worked on it: Arlo Heinrichs, who did the difficult work of establishing initial contact with the Pirahã and worked with them from 1959 to 1967, publishing a preliminary view of the phonemes of the language (Heinrichs 1964), and Steven Neil Sheldon, who worked on the language from 1967 to 1976 and knows it fairly well. But Everett and his then wife Keren were the first SIL members who learned to speak and understand the language fluently. Everett’s translation of the Gospel of Mark (Everett 1986a) was the first piece of bible translation SIL had ever achieved for the language.

To guide Everett and the other contributors of the grammatical sketches in HAL, Derbyshire and I had produced an analytical table of contents, much briefer than the questionnaire for the LDS but inspired by it. We reproduced it in HAL 1, pp. 31–32. And (the crucial point) Section 14 was to be headed “Subordinate clauses”. Everett had in fact already seen LDSQ as soon as it appeared, and was already assuming that he had to say things about subordinate clauses.

It should not be too surprising, then, if Everett diligently strove to find and exemplify subordinate clauses, looking for all the usual grammatical furniture that speakers of European languages and syntacticians at MIT would expect sentences to exhibit. NP&R represent it as suspicious that he would say in 1983 and 1986b that there were subordinate clauses and then say in 2005 that there weren’t. But he was effectively being directed to say something about subordinate clauses by both of the two sets of instructions he was using as guidance.

Looking back now, what surprises me that Derbyshire and I did not rethink our guidance, and change the question to “Are subordinate clauses found in the language?”, because by the early 1980s we knew what Hixkaryana had taught us about the topic of subordinate clauses. Derbyshire followed LDSQ’s directions closely, so linguists do not have to wonder about what the subordinate clauses are like in any language with an LDS monograph; they can just turn to Section 1.1.2 and find out. Here is what Derbyshire says about Hixkaryana (p.21):

1.1.2. Subordination

Subordination is restricted to nonfinite verbal forms, specifically derived nominals (or, pseudo-nominals that function as adverbials – see 1.1.2.2.6).

Hixkaryana, then, had no content clauses at all. And turning to Section 1.1.2.3, “Adjective clauses (relative clauses)” – I’ll use the latter, more modern term – we find that in Section 1.1.2.3.1 the marking of relative clauses was to be described; in 1.1.2.3.2 the description should say whether there is a distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses; and other subsections ask about their word order, etc. Here is the relevant passage:
1.1.2.3. Adjective clauses (relative clauses)

There is no construction of the adjective clause (relative clause) type. There are various means used to obtain the same effect as such a clause: simple nominalization; placing NPs together in a paratactic relationship, with intonational break; descriptive sentence, usually involving an equative clause (see 1.2.1.1.4); or some combination of these means.

So relative clauses did not exist in Hixkaryana either.

LDSQ also requires that 1.1.2.4 should cover “adverb clauses”, i.e. clauses functioning as modifiers of location, manner, purpose, cause, condition, result, or degree (1.1.2.4.2.1 – 1.1.2.4.2.7). On these, Derbyshire says:

1.1.2.4. Adverb clauses
The nearest equivalent to adverb clauses is what I have called adverb pseudo-clauses, for the same reason that I use the term ‘pseudo-clause’ in connection with nominal constructions (see 1.1.2.2.6). These adverb pseudo-clauses are either (i) postpositional phrases with a derived nominal as head of the phrase, or (ii) constructions whose nuclear element is a pseudo-nominal, without a postposition ...

Thus Hixkaryana also lacks finite clauses serving adjunct function; it uses noun phrases (NPs) or phrases headed by adpositions (positional ones, henceforth PPs).

One other relevant thing Derbyshire reports (Section 1.3, p. 45) is that “There are no formal means in the language for expressing coordination at either the sentence or phrase level”. The English coordinators and, but, and or have no direct equivalents.

To summarize, everything one can immediately think of that might be used as the basis of an argument that sentences could be of arbitrary length in Hixkaryana is ruled out. Hixkaryana could have been mentioned among the languages I discussed in Section §1 for which the possibility of an infinite sentence inventory had been questioned in the literature long before 2005.

3.2 Everett’s 1986 grammatical sketch

Everett’s description of Pirahã (1986b), a revised English version of the descriptive part of his PhD dissertation occupying 125 pages of HAL 1, is considerably more than a sketch. It gives Section 14 (p. 262) a longer introduction than other descriptions in HAL, postponing exemplification for the more detailed subsections that followed. He mentioned topics like nominalization, parataxis, and the
expression of temporal and conditional adjuncts, and but mostly commented on
the complex verb morphology of the language, which allows for new verbs to be
formed by including more than one verb root in a single word. Everett calls this
“verb incorporation”, mentioning the phenomenon known in relational grammar
as clause union, but what he calls verb incorporation lacks two defining features
of clause union: the amalgamated verb roots are invariably understood with the
same predicand, and (significantly) he mentions that evidence of “underlying
bisententiality” is absent.

Everett states unequivocally that “There is no preclausal complementizer such
as English that in Pirahã” (p. 262). In the early 1980s it was of course very natural
to look for a “complementizer”: Everett was strongly interested in government-
binding theory (his dissertation title includes the words “and the theory of syn-
tax”), and he wanted to show how transformational grammar would apply to Pi-
rahã. But there was no COMP node to be found, because there were no finite com-
plement clauses for them to introduce. This means the familiar right-branching
nested English constructions that we invariably exhibit to undergraduates in our
syntax classes (A knows that B said that C thinks that P) cannot be paralleled in
a single Pirahã sentence.

Having noticed this, Everett voiced his suspicions to Noam Chomsky in con-
versation. Directly after receiving his PhD, before HAL 1 was published, he re-
ceived a fellowship enabling him to spend a year (1984–85) as a visiting scholar
at MIT, where he had a conversation that he describes as follows (Everett 2007:
12, fn. 7):

I talked to Chomsky about my idea that there seemed to be very little evi-
dence for embedding of any kind in Pirahã, apart from these -sai examples
which I was beginning to question. We discussed it briefly and Noam gave
me some ideas for further testing the idea. Mark Baker, writing his PhD un-
der Noam at the time, mentioned to me one day as we were having lunch
that Noam was really intrigued by the idea that a language might not have
embedd[ing] (Mark said something like “You really got Noam’s attention
with what you told him about Pirahã” …).

Chomsky, then, had heard about the apparent lack of embedding in Pirahã from
Everett himself, twenty years before the CA paper, and was quite interested.

Everett adds: “I had a growing suspicion that my 1982 analysis was wrong,
based … on artificially and exclusively elicited data” (I return later to the highly
significant issue of data elicitation), but he says he “did not take the time to work
out an analysis with no hypotaxis at all until 2004, when working at the Max
Planck Institute in Leipzig.”
4 Subordination and nominalization

NP&R were well aware that there were Amazonian languages that seemed to use nominalizations to do the work that English would do with subordinate clauses. They make this relevant point:

As is well known, it is quite common for embedded clauses to look more “nominal” than their main-clause counterparts, due to a partial or complete suppression of tense, aspect, or agreement distinctions found in the verbs of main clauses. Koptjevskaja-Tamm (1993) adopts from Stassen 1985 the term deranked (vs. balanced) for reduced embedded clauses of this sort. Koptjevskaja-Tamm offers many examples of languages that (either exclusively or quite generally) use deranked constructions with nominal properties for complement-clause embedding. (Nevins et al. 2009c: 370)

They cite languages like Adyghe, Ancient Greek, Classical Latin, Inuktitut, Quechua, and Turkish as illustrating such “deranking”, and add that “deranked embedded clauses appear to be common among Amazonian languages”, citing Derbyshire (1987) and several descriptions from HAL, among them Wai Wai, Macushi, and the HAL 1 chapter on Apalai (Koehn & Koehn 1986).

What they don’t mention is that they are just repeating this point from Everett (2005: 629). It is Everett who cited Koptjevskaja Tamm’s book. And that book is about nominalizations, not subordinate clauses. If we “rank” constituents by reference to main clause features such as tense, nominalizations could be regarded intuitively as “deranked” compared to content clauses. But nominalizations are NPs, not clauses. We were unaware that the enemy had destroyed the city has a subordinate clause in it, but We were unaware of the enemy’s destruction of the city does not. After the publication of Chomsky (1970), generative grammarians ceased even trying to derive nominalizations transformationally from clauses.

What’s more, linguists still do not know how to draw a clear line between embedded clauses and nominalizations. It is clear even for English. There are several constructions that can (at least approximately) express the semantic content of a clause in a less assertion-like or prominent way. Some express the downgraded material in a clause-like constituent that lacks certain main clause properties such as tense or agreement; but others, like Hixkaryana, have only very rough semantic parallels to clause structures, exhibiting both the structure and the distribution of NPs. Consider the following English expressions related to the declarative main clause I ate it:

(1) a. that I ate it
   [finite content clause]
b. for me to eat it
   [infinitival clause]

  c. me eating it
   [“acc-ing” construction]

  d. my eating it
   [“poss-ing” construction]

  e. my eating of it
   [event nominalization, genitive determiner NP as agent]

  f. the eating of it
   [event nominalization with definite article]

Uncontroversially, ((1)a) is a transitive content clause, and most modern linguists would call ((1)b) a transitive clause too. And ((1)f) is certainly a simple definite NP. But in between there are other constructions. The trouble starts with ((1)c). Linguists differ radically on where clauses stop and NPs begin. The morphology of the head in ((1)c) and ((1)d) is no help: the -ing verb form is called the “gerund-participle” in The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language (Huddleston & Pullum 2002) because no verb in English distinguishes the form used in the progressive aspect (I am eating it) from the form used in ((1)c) and ((1)d). Morphology therefore does not help draw the line between clauses and NPs (after all, many words ending in -ing, though derived from verb roots, do not belong to verb lexemes at all).24

The generative literature on these constructions has considered arguments based on a wide range of phenomena; Pullum (1991) gives a systematic survey of the data. Calling ((1)d) an NP accounts nicely for the way it can be the object of a preposition, as in She disapproved of my eating it. Jackendoff (1977: 222–223) accordingly takes that view; so does Pullum (1991); and so does Blevins (2005), despite having criticisms of Pullum (1991) and citing others who disagree with it. Kiparsky (2017), however, carefully argues for treating ((1)d) as a clause – but a clause with the unusual property of needing (in Chomskyan terms) to be assigned case, as NPs are. That is essentially what Stowell (1981) also advocated. It agrees with Jackendoff, Pullum, and Blevins that ((1)d) has the external syntax of an NP, but differs by assigning it the root node label that clauses have.

24 An unhelpful irrelevance, which I will ignore, is that many prescriptive usage authorities insist that ((1)c) is a deprecated form that should be corrected to ((1)d). I take this view to be untenable; the more scholarly usage manuals reject it, noting the free variation between them found throughout English literature.
Neither Pullum nor Kiparsky is very clear on the status of ((1)c), the so-called “acc-ing” construction. Blevins argues firmly that it too is an NP. However, Rodney Huddleston convinced me, a decade after I wrote Pullum (1991), that it is a clause, and also that the “acc-ing” and “poss-ing” constructions are too similar in both external and internal syntax to make it plausible that one is a clause and the other is not. So The Cambridge Grammar treats both ((1)c) and ((1)d) as non-finite subordinate clauses differing only in the superficial case-marking of the subject. My earlier view disagrees with my later view, and I am still not entirely sure which is right. (I was lucky enough not to face an inquisition by NP&R accusing me of trying to dishonestly cover up my earlier view.)

There is much more generative literature on “acc-ing” and “poss-ing” constructions than I can discuss here, but the bottom line is that six decades after the earliest generative studies of English nominalization and subordination, there is still no sign of broad agreement on where to draw the line between NP and clause constituents. And if linguists are not clear where we should draw the line between clauses and nominalizations in English, we can hardly be confident about answering similar questions in vastly less-studied languages. For Nevins and colleagues to claim they know exactly where to draw the line between clauses and NPs for Pirahã is absurd hubris.

4.1 A few Pirahã examples

NP&R spend 50 pages of Language trawling through Everett’s work looking for dishonesty. They blow plenty of smoke but come up with essentially nothing definitive. I’ll discuss just three examples that might appear to be of interest because their English translations contain non-finite subordinate clauses. They can be found in Everett (1986b) Section 14.2.1, headed “Infinitives, participials and gerundives”, pp. 262–263 (just the terms that might be used if the section were describing English).25

(2)  a. Kóʔoi soʔóá ?ibiibihiá  tióbáhái biío  kai-sai
   Kóʔoi already order.prox.rel.cert child  grass do [+sai]

   b. hi  obáaʔáí  kahái  kai-sai
   3rd see/know.intens arrow make [+sai]

For ((2)a) and ((2)b) Everett gives English translations containing infinitival subordinate clauses. His free translation of ((2)a) is ‘Kóʔoi already ordered the child

25In citing Pirahã I’ll follow Everett’s transcription, except that his orthographic ‘x’ for the glottal stop consonant is singularly hard for a linguist to get used to, so I replace it with the IPA glottal stop symbol ‘ʔ’ in transcribed examples.
to cut the grass’ (where ‘relcert’ is an epistemic mood suffix signaling a report of something relatively certain). His translation of ((2)b) is ‘He really knows how to make arrows.’ NP&R seize upon these as examples of the subordinate clauses that Everett is supposedly now trying to conceal. But Everett actually took both to be nominalizations correspond to the subordinate clauses in English (an echo of the way Derbyshire had found nominalizations doing the work that English does with subordinate clauses). Both have the verb stem kai, which is like French faire in meaning both ‘do’ and ‘make’. The constituents at issue are biío kai-sai (grass-doing) and kahaí kai-sai (arrow-making).

In the 1980s Everett thought -sai was a nominalizer, glossing it ‘nomlzr’, and he continues to gloss it as ‘nominalizer’ in the CA article (where it is misprinted several times as ‘nominative’ owing to careless proofreading). This could mean that the examples might have been better translated as ‘Kóʔoi already assigned the child the grass-cutting’ and ‘He really knows arrow manufacture.’ NP&R, of course, have no idea whether the NP analysis is correct, or whether we are looking at subjectless non-finite VPs.

The results of their poring over Everett’s work cannot be construed as adequate support for the claim they want to make – that Pirahã has clause embedding of the sort familiar from the Indo-European languages.

A few pages later Everett gives (in his (290) on p. 278) example (3), which might look more promising as a case of a subordinate clause.

(3) hi ti ?api-sai ?ogi-hiab-a
    3rd 1st go [+sai] want.not.rem.pst

It consists of a 3rd-person pronoun, a 1st-person pronoun, a verb meaning ‘go’ with sai suffixed, a verb stem that means ‘want’, the negative suffix hiab, and the remote aspect suffix a (on which see Everett 1986b: 293–294). In his early work, up to 1986, Everett thought it might best be translated as ‘He doesn’t want me to go.’ NP&R seize upon it as a highly significant case of his having cited a sentence with a subordinate clause in object position preceding a matrix verb of desiring (see their (23) on p. 375). It surely could not be plausibly treated as two successive main clauses in paratactic relationship.

But (3) is problematic in a way that Nevins et al. (2009b) were unaware of – and here they fell victims to their policy of avoiding all contact with Everett. Looking back at the origin of sentence (3), Everett recalls that he constructed it himself, and asked speakers whether it was acceptable – a use of the problematic “can-you-say” question.

Everett was never able to make much use of questions put to speakers in his language learning. “How-do-you-say” questions (Samarin 1967: 114, Ch 6, Sakel
Geoffrey K. Pullum

& Everett 2012: §6.4) were ruled out because he had no contact language in which to ask them.26 Hardly any Pirahã men (and none of the women) have even the crudest smattering of Portuguese (again, see Sakel 2012); no one raised as a native speaker in the Pirahã community seems ever to have subsequently become fluent in Portuguese. Everett does mention that early on he would sometimes be able to point to something and ask “How do you say that?” (Everett 2008: 20) – presumably to elicit a noun; but that won’t do for most concepts.

Later on, when he had attained a basic grasp of the language, he relied a lot on “perambulatory elicitation” (Everett 1986b: 200), which means walking around the village chatting to people. But that still cannot be called upon to elicit some key form that will help resolve some puzzle about syntactic possibilities. When his conversational abilities had improved enough, therefore, Everett sometimes used “can-you-say” questions. These have the advantage of being usable in a fully monolingual situation, given only enough command of the target language to express the question “Can you say S?” and pronounce the conjectured candidate utterance S. So it becomes possible, at least potentially, to check hypotheses about what is grammatical. But of course you don’t know what you’re going to get.

This mode of proceeding calls for great caution, especially when working with linguistically unsophisticated speakers (which will be most speakers of most languages in the world, of course). “Can you say” questions presuppose that the consultant will understand that the S is being mentioned, not used, and that the linguist is not asking for permission to say something, or asking about physical possibility, but rather wants a judgement of concerning grammatically correctness in isolation from context. What Everett discovered in later years was that the Pirahã had regularly been saying “Yes” to his occasional “Can-you-say-S?” questions, just to humor him, even if the S was decidedly unidiomatic.

Everett was caught out by exactly this behavior in another case. Early in his study of Pirahã he assumed it obviously should be possible to have more than one attributive modifier in the structure of a Pirahã NP, just as in English. In example (268) of Everett (1986b: 273) he cited (4) as the largest NP he had in his corpus (and I give his 1986 glosses):

(4) kabogáohoi biísi hoíhio ?itaíʔi
   barrel red two heavy
   ‘two heavy red barrels’

The two modifiers might suggest modifiers can be stacked in NP. But he had made several errors with (4). The example wasn’t really in his corpus in any

26Fastidious field linguists shun them anyway, even when a contact language is available. Bloomfield never used them at all, according to Voegelin (1960: 204).
strict sense. He expressed unease even when citing it, acknowledging that the example “is rather artificial” and “was not taken from textual material but rather was separately elicited.” He later became convinced that the example is ungrammatical. Just as he discovered that *biisi* (based on *bi’i* ‘blood’) means ‘bloodlike’ rather than ‘red’, and *hoihiho* doesn’t mean exactly 2 but rather ‘a couple’ or ‘a bit’ (in a vague sense that implies roughly 2 or 3 with count nouns), he also learned that it was another case of informants who said things were fine as a way of being tolerant of his imperfect grasp of their language: they would nearly always assent to his “can you say” questions. When he finally persuaded a speaker to give him the straight truth on whether (4) was acceptable, he was told: “Pirahã don’t say that. You can say that. You are not Pirahã” (Everett 2009: 422).

The same sort of thing seems to have happened with (3). Since Everett never recorded anything like it in spontaneous use, he recently decided to seek a second opinion on it from Keren Madora (the only outsider who has lived with the Pirahã longer than Everett, and the only other outsider who is truly fluent in Pirahã). She was formerly married to Everett, but today she still lives very near the Pirahã area and is in regular contact with speakers. Her opinion (email, Madora to Everett, 10 January 2023) was that he is correct, (3) is ungrammatical. Pirahã speakers never spontaneously say anything like (3).

Highly relevant information concerning the suffix *-sai* was published in 2010 but was not available in 1986 or 2009. New empirical evidence indicates that *-sai* is not a nominalizer at all. Two of the only linguists outside of SIL who have worked directly with Pirahã speakers in a context where they could get reliable translations, Jeanette Sakel and Eugenie Stapert, constructed some test sentences by concatenating two Pirahã clauses translatable as ‘it’s raining’ (*piiboibai*) and ‘I don’t go’ (*ti kahápíhiaba*), intended to suggest the meaning ‘If it’s raining, I don’t go’, and suffixing *-sai* to either the first clause or the second. They then asked nine speakers (seven women, two men) to simply repeat back what they’d said. They found that the informants’ responses might have *-sai* on the first clause, or the second, or both, or neither, regardless of which input sentence they were given.

Their conclusion (see Sakel & Stapert 2010: 5–6) is that *-sai* “does not appear to be a marker of subordination, as originally claimed by Everett (1986)” (and they mean that it is not a marker of nominalization either). Everett agrees, and now believes it may be an optional marker for sentences conveying discourse-old information. Its random placement in sentence repetitions would be as expected if its old-information signaling role only made sense in a discourse context: speakers charged with repeating two sentences with no context apparently recalled vaguely that there was a *-sai* in there somewhere, but didn’t necessarily remember where.
What does it mean for sentences like ((2)a) and ((2)b), if -sai might not be either a nominalizer or a subordination marker after all? I’m not sure. And I don’t think anyone really is. But when looking at attested Pirahã examples, with their short clauses and unclear syntactic linkages, it is definitely useful to recall the perceptive remarks of Liberman (2006) on Language Log, published before either the Nevins boycott move or the first draft of NP&R’s paper, about sentences in conversational English as recorded by novelists with a good ear for colloquial speech. Liberman gives examples from Elmore Leonard. One character is quoted as saying things like ‘We get to a phone, we’re out of the country before morning.’ In the context it is clear that the intended meaning is conditional. One can imagine such a speaker saying, ‘It’s raining, I don’t go.’ Everett cites very similar examples of what he then thought were conditional clauses. For example (Everett 1986b: 265, ex. (241)):}

(5) Paió hi abópaisaí ti ʔíi oáboíhai.

Paió hi abóp-ai-saí ti ʔíi oá-boí-haí
(name) 3sg turn-go-ATEL-COND I thing buy-come-NEAR-CERTAIN
‘Paió comes back, I’m gonna buy something.’

I am not in any way suggesting that everything is now resolved and the picture is clear. Far from it. We have no truly reliable principles to use in order to decide whether some Pirahã construction is more analogous to if he returns or him returning or his returning or his return. All sorts of unclarities remain. Everett acknowledges having made errors in both elicitation and analysis; in 1986 he thought -sai was a morpheme forming subordinated constituents of some kind, probably nominalizations that played the role subordinate clauses would play in European languages, but after the convincing work of Sakel and Stapert he no longer thinks that. It has been definitely confirmed that -sai sometimes appears on what in English might be a subordinate clause but also sometimes appears on what in English would be a main clause.

In 1986 Everett also thought there were two -sai morphemes, differing in tone, but subsequent F0 measurements by Miguel Oliveira have revealed no statistically significant tonal difference (a rough set of slides presenting the results was made available as Oliveira & Everett 2010). Everett now thinks there is just one -sai.

What cannot be said given the present state of our knowledge is that NP&R have refuted Everett’s thesis about Pirahã sentences never exhibiting clause embedding. One might perhaps argue that the case is still open, but not that NP&R examined the matter and settled it – which is what far too many linguists (Chomsky included) have been lazy enough to assume. Simply citing Nevins et al. (2009c)
without getting into any of the details is not sufficient. Those who are truly in-
tent on trying to support the ungracious claim that Everett lied are going to have
to start learning Pirahã.

4.2 The crucial issue of embedding depth

There is a vital point about nominalizations that NP&R either failed to notice
or chose not to mention. What we really need to know, if we are to address the
only issue that makes this discussion sensible, is whether a Pirahã nominalization
(or non-finite clause or whatever) can be embedded inside another, and the result
inside another, and so on, to arbitrary depths. NP&R struggle to find even a single
case of a fully clear subordinate clause in Everett’s early work (and they never
venture to propose a structure for even a single sentence), but they certainly
never even touch on the matter of showing embedding that can be reiterated to
arbitrary depth. Nothing they say suggests that subordination in Pirahã (if it has
any) can give rise to sentences of arbitrary length. And that is what any serious
notion of “recursion” has to be about.

In Standard English, after more than a thousand years of literacy (which O’Neil
1977, Givón 1979, Mithun 1984, and Kalmár 1985 suggest might be a crucial consid-
eration) now has fairly rich nominalization resources: even a clause like A knows
[that B said [that C thinks [that D predicts [it will rain]]]] can be paired with
a cumbersome NP analog like A’s knowledge of B’s statement about C’s opinion
concerning D’s prediction of impending rain with roughly the same content.27 But
are such multiple embeddings of NPs constructible in every language? I have
never been able to see a way in which the nominalization resources of languages
like Hixkaryana, Apalai, or Pirahã could be used to replicate any such internally
ramified NP constructions. The most that NP&R have to suggest is that in one
or two Pirahã examples there may be depth-1 subordination of a non-finite sec-
ondary predication, but they really only have what look like adsentential modify-
ing phrases appended to a clause. They cannot exhibit Pirahã evidence support-
ing the claims of so many linguists that iterated embedding in human languages
is always allowed to unbounded depth. That is the claim Everett was challenging.

27The reader might like to consider whether one could construct a nominalization that exactly
captures the content of the husband’s thought in Bruce Eric Kaplan’s well-known New Yorker
cartoon (26 October 1998), where a man earnestly assures his wife: “Of course I care about how
you imagined I thought you perceived I wanted you to feel”.
5 Hallucinated PP self-embedding

The work presented in *Recursion Across Domains* (Amaral et al. 2018) is of astonishingly low quality, replete with glaring mistakes. The review by Everett & Gibson (2019) provides a selection of the evidence, concentrating most on Pirahã, on which the authors had worked together in the field. For the second review that Language commissioned, the editors certainly found the right man for the job: Hornstein (2019) faithfully repeated Chomsky’s theoretical position on “recursion”, elaborating the rhetorical escape-hatch arguments (see Section §1 above), and then proceeded to uncritically endorse all data-oriented contributions in the book regardless of their merits. Thus he reported that by using a truth-value judgment experiment Uli Sauerland (2018) had managed to “provide pretty dispositive evidence that Pirahã allows sentential embedding under ‘say’” (p. 796). In truth Sauerland’s statistical analysis has vitiating flaws, and when his experiment is run on English speakers it does not produce the results that would be needed to support his claims anyway (see the analysis by Everett & Gibson 2019: 781–784, who took the trouble to review the use of statistics and test his experimental design on English speakers, and the more detailed critique by chapters/2_gibson, Chapter ?? of this volume).

I will not attempt a general survey of the material in *Recursion Across Domains* here, but I will just address a particularly incompetent chapter about Pirahã PPs. Neither of the Language reviews mentioned the stunning error, and presumably none of the referees for the book noticed it either.

The chapter by Filomena Sandalo, Cilene Rodrigues, Tom Roeper, Luiz Amaral, Marcus Maia, and Glauber Romling da Silva (2018) claims that Pirahã syntax allows PPs to be embedded inside other PPs, and reports experiments purportedly showing that native speakers have no difficulty in processing and interpreting such phrases. The authors assume (as is clear from their (15) on p. 285) that the English phrase *the coin on the paper on the chair on the board* has a right-branching structure with a single NP constituent containing all the PPs as modifiers of successively embedded NPs: *chair on the board, paper on the chair on the board*, and so on.

They claim that Pirahã has precisely analogous phrases, with two differences. First, Pirahã lacks determinatives such as the English definite and indefinite articles; accordingly, it makes sense to ignore articles in the English structure shown below – it simplifies the tree structure considerably. And second, Pirahã PPs are postpositional. The right-branching structure for English diagrammed (without articles) in (Figure 1a) is claimed to have an analogous left-branching structure in Pirahã with the terminal string ‘*tabo apo tiapati apo kapiiga apo gigohoi*’.
(Sandalo et al. 2018) mistranscribe all of these words, but I set that aside that for now.) Taking into account “the fact that Pirahã is a head-final language”, they assume that an English structure in (Figure 1a) – where I omit determiners to save space – has an exact analog in Pirahã, which they depict (in their (19) on p. 287) as shown in (Figure 1b).

Sandalo et al. (2018) have overlooked a crucial syntactic fact. Pirahã is not a uniformly head-final language. As Everett noted forty years ago, in the noun phrase “modifiers follow, while possessors normally precede, the phrase head” (Everett 1986b: 272). He lays out the sequence of elements in the NP as follows (p. 273):28

\[(\text{possessor}) + (\text{pro.clitic}) + \text{N} + (\text{modifier}) + (\text{numeral}) + (\text{determiner})\]

The vital point is that modifiers follow the head in NPs. So if there were noun-modifying postpositional PPs embedded in NPs within other such PPs, the result would be nothing like the fictive left-branching tree in (Figure 1b). In fact there’s a good reason that languages with nouns postmodified by PPs don’t allow iteration of the construction: it yields center-embedding of the sort that poses major difficulties for human sentence processing – the kind seen in English center-embedded sentences like ?? The children the women the soldiers left saved protested.

28See also Everett (1983: 132–136)). Pirahã has no true numerals in the sense of names for the natural numbers, but presumably its vague quantity-related items like báagiso or ñaibá ‘many’, ñogii ‘a lot’, and ñoíhi ‘few’ take that slot in the NP.
The purported phrase Sandalo et al. (2018) are trying to diagram would actually come out as in Figure 2, where I correct the transcriptions and word identification as well as the structure.

No one has ever suggested that PPs like in Figure 2 are encountered in Pirahã discourse, and no such structures were presented to Sandalo et al.’s (2018) hapless informant.²⁹

It is difficult to guess what must have gone on in their experimentation (they stress that it is to be regarded only as a pilot study). They claim to have found that a native speaker named Iaoá understood their pronunciation of the purely fictional phrase (Figure 1b). Given that the word they write as tiapapati seems...
to be the imperative verb *tíapapaáti*, meaning ‘sit down’ (Everett & Gibson 2019: 786–787), Iaoá would have heard them as saying something that meant roughly ‘Sit on the board. On top. On the paper. Money.’ The corrected string is given in (7):

\[(7) \text{ tábo } \ʔapoó \text{ tiapap } \ʔapoó \text{ kapiiga } \ʔapoó \text{ giígo-hoí}
\]

board on chair on paper on money

The most likely guess at how Iaoá or any native speaker would have parsed this would be as a list of successive PPs and a final NP, as in (Figure 3).

![Figure 3: Most likely native-speaker parse of (7)](image)

Convinced that they had identified nested PPs in Pirahã, Sandalo et al. (2018: 289–292) proceeded to construct some test sentences paired with pictures of alligators on mats on rocks on beaches, and claim to have used them to produce evidence for interpretation of nested PPs. They claim a picture of an alligator on a mat on a beach was reliably distinguished from a picture of an alligator on a mat beside another alligator on a beach. Further discussion of this experiment is not really feasible; their account is too ill-informed and confused, replete with botched transcriptions, mistaken glosses, misidentified words (*tahoasi* is glossed as ‘mat’ when it actually means ‘beach’ – the word for ‘mat’ is *paahóísi*), and so on.

In another experiment they tried to get Iaoá to play a “game” involving coins being put on a paper that was on a chair on a board, or on a paper on a chair, or on a paper on a board. They note (p. 294) that where they supplied a string like “*gigohoi kapiiga apo tiapapati apo tabo apo*” (intended to be *giígo-hoí kapiiga ʔapoó tiapap ʔapoó tábo ʔapoó*, glossed ‘coin paper-on chair-on board-on’), when Iaoá repeated the string “he switched the order of the PPs in the sentence”, yielding what they wrongly transcribe as ‘*tabo apo tiapapati apo kapiiga apo gigohoi*’ (‘board-on chair-on paper-on coin’). This was a sign of something gone terribly wrong: Iaoá was unable to come anywhere near repeating what they thought was a single NP in his language. But in an almost unbelievable fit of wishful thinking (hope springs eternal in the human breast), they interpret this as “spontaneous
evidence” in favor of their hypothesis! It seems more likely that Iaoá scarcely knew what was going on, but took their attempted PPs to be independent phrases, not successively embedded modifiers in an NP, and repeated them back in LIFO (last in, first out) order.

There is also a very simple semantic observation that may play a role in interpreting the events that they take as vindication of their hallucinated PP embedding claims. We normally take the ‘on’ relation between medium-sized physical objects to be transitive. Any coin on a piece of paper on a chair is also a coin on a chair. Any alligator on a mat on a beach is an alligator on a beach.

The most plausible conclusion from Sandalo et al.’s (2018) bungled experiments is that Iaoá parsed the fictive PPs individually, and then (with the sharp general intelligence Everett has always noted among the Pirahã) simply guessed what the linguists wanted him to do.

6 Sentence-length extensibility more generally

As promised earlier, I have avoided the impenetrable thickets of confusion found where linguists use the words “recursive” and “recursion”, focusing instead on the clearer issue of syntactic devices that can in principle allow the construction of sentences of arbitrary length.

The issue does not have the fundamental importance that some have seen in it. Linguistic creativity is not tied to any claim about an infinitude of sentences, since human linguistic creativity resides mainly at the discourse level. Nor is it tied to the ability to grasp concepts: absence of propositional attitude verbs in a language, for example, would not entail speakers’ inability to engage in metacognition. Everett deftly illustrates how a complex proposition with a logical form like \[ \text{if } [P \text{ and } Q] \text{ then } R \] does not need to be expressed in one sentence when he titled one of his conference papers: “You drink. You drive. You go to jail. Where’s recursion?” (Everett 2010).

Everett’s opponents sometimes seem to have assumed that linguistic life with only simple main clauses would hardly be worth living. But there is no reason to regard a language lacking unbounded sentence extensibility devices as less useful or expressive than a language. Kornai (2014) argues that the information-carrying complexity of a finite language can actually be greater than that of an infinite one.

One way of stressing the difference between finite and infinite languages, often touched on in undergraduate textbooks, depends on pointing out that for a finite language the grammar could be given in the form of a simple list of sentences. But that was never a very sensible point to harp on. From the complexity
of verbs alone (Everett 1986b: 288–301) it is apparent that the set of Pirahã sentences would be way too vast even to be compiled, stored, or accessed by either a brain or a currently imaginable computer, let alone to be of real online use either cognitively or computationally. The grammatical complexity of Pirahã would still pose the usual problems for the theory of language acquisition: inducing generalizations from exposure to data would have to be involved, not just memorizing complete utterances. As chapters/2_gibson, Chapter ?? of this volume argues, what’s important is compression of information (Kolmogorov complexity), not infinitude.

Whether the set of all sentences in a language is finite or not is in any case inherently difficult to settle, for a number of reasons, and would remain so even if all of Everett’s specific claims about Pirahã syntax are accepted.

First, the lexicon has to be stipulatively fixed at some finite number \( N \) of words, though we have no clue about what \( N \) might be because new words (e.g. personal names) are being coined all the time, and the interaction of agglutinative word formation and lexicalization in languages like Turkish or Inuktitut makes it implausible that there is any such \( N \) at all.

Second, the notion “sentence” needs a clear definition; syntacticians casually assume it is a well-understood primitive term, but it is not easily defined at all. Separating a passage of spoken language into sentences in a way that a different linguist would replicate is very difficult, and beset with problems raised by false starts, parenthetical interruptions, direct quotations, appositional expansions, rhetorical repetitions, whatever semicolons represent in writing, and asyndeton (coordination without coordinator words, as in Dickens’s *It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness …*).

Third, with regard to hypotaxis (subordination), Pawley & Syder (2000) argue that it hardly occurs at all in spontaneous speech, even in English, once we set aside a limited number of high-frequency partially customizable schemata like *I think __* or *It depends whether __*, and similar formulas. This would presumably be all the more true for languages spoken in cultures where no one writes or reads. A few folk tales or epic poems might have a broadly fixed (or even faithfully memorized) traditional form, but most language use will be informal chatting, and Pawley and Syder claim that spur-of-the-moment construction of hypotactic sentences will be rare to nonexistent.

There are other phenomena that could introduce difficulties: NP apposition, roughly definable as adjacent iterated NPs with the same reference and syntactic function (Karlsson 2010 cites an attested five-NP example in Swedish); intensificatory or iconic repetition of attributive adjectives (*a big, big, big problem*) or
adverbs (*I really, really mean it*) or VPs *They hit me and hit me and hit me...*) or NPs (*cows, cows, ... cows, as far as you could see*). Such possibilities are seldom noted in reference grammars. It only study of large corpora of Pirahâ texts will tell us whether such iterable sentence-lengthening constructions are found in the syntax of an exclusively oral language like Pirahâ.

How might we even estimate the likelihood that Pirahâ truly has no unbounded syntactic resources for sentence lengthening? A beautiful and oddly neglected paper by Widmer et al. (2017) addresses this question. Widmer and colleagues suggest some additional methods that could be employed to figure out the probability of a language lacking such resources. They identify five ways in which NPs in Indo-European languages can be lengthened by embedding other NPs inside them: stacked genitive determiners, adjectivization-derived modifiers, modifiers with head marking, adpositional modifiers, and simple noun juxtaposition (I assume apposition is to be included under the latter heading). They show that Indo-European languages have repeatedly developed such devices and also lost them through syntactic change over the past few thousand years.

Through a clever calculation they then assess how likely an Indo-European language is to end up at a given time with at least one such device in its NP syntax, concluding that it is very high indeed: they estimate that with probability ~0.98, any Indo-European language, at any given point in its history, will have at least one grammatical device for arbitrarily expanding NPs. As an explanatory conjecture, they suggest that for some reason the human processing capacity finds it helpful for there to be some such mechanism provided by the grammar.

However, they add (p. 822): “With regard to sentence-level syntax, it remains an open question whether syntactic recursion or simple conjunction is preferred.” To settle it, “a larger sample of data would be needed.” We cannot know what the answer is, or how likely it is that any arbitrary language in the world (not just in the Indo-European family) would have some kind of iterable sentence-lengthening syntactic device available at all times in its history. But suppose the probability of languages having such features were as high as ~0.99. It would still be expected, given the 7,000 languages attested in the world today, that there might be 70 languages or more in which such devices are absent. The literature on ancient languages and languages of preliterate cultures has thrown up quite a few candidates, as discussed in Section §1. Pirahâ just happens to be the clearest case – and the one that kicked the hornets’ nest politically.
7 Conclusions

No one should claim, in the present state of our knowledge, that we have a good understanding of the syntax of Pirahã (or for that matter any other language, even Standard English). The corpus study of Pirahã syntax by Futrell et al. (2016) is a sterling effort at utilizing what materials we have (specifically, parsing texts collected by Steven Sheldon in an effort to find evidence of subordination), but in many ways it just underlines how woefully unclear things are. Much more work has to be done.

That work will not be accomplished without collaborations that involve people who (i) have no advance commitment to particular results or empirical claims and (ii) are prepared to spend time paying close attention to everyday usage in the Pirahã speech community. That will mean extended residence in Pirahã villages, and consultation with people who have substantial experience with the language.

Such people exist. Steven Neil Sheldon worked on the language from 1967 to 1976, and knows it well. Caleb Everett, Kristene Diggins, and Shannon Russell all learned to speak and understand the language when living in Pirahã villages as children, and their parents Daniel Everett and Keren Madora are outsiders with unprecedented fluency. Madora has studied the language in depth since 1977 and still lives close to the Pirahã villages; Everett spent a total of about eight and a half years with the Pirahã between 1977 and 2006, and made various visits thereafter, becoming fully fluent in the language. He translated the *Gospel of Mark* into it (Everett 1986a). Yet NP&R decided to work without having a single conversation with any of these people.

This represents a sadly missed opportunity. If linguists like NP&R had applied their analytical theoretical abilities to the available data in a collaborative spirit, drawing on the knowledge of active speakers of the language (particularly Everett himself), new linguistic insights might have been gained. That chance has been lost, probably forever. They have wrecked their credibility by making it so obvious that from the start they aimed simply to bring Everett into disrepute. All that linguistics ended up getting out of their work was an uninformed retrospective document review. They have divided linguists into two irreconcilable warring camps, and made the entire discipline of linguistics look, as it did to Tom Bartlett, like a snakepit of hostility.

Like any scientists, linguists have a duty to maintain ethical standards and intellectual open-mindedness – even when someone is claiming Chomsky was wrong about something, or when the popular press tries to fluff up a science story into something earth-shaking or theory-troubling and publishes absurd overstatements.
Certainly it was ridiculous hyperbole for *New Scientist* (18 March 2006) to call Everett’s account of Pirahã “the final nail in the coffin for Noam Chomsky’s hugely influential theory of universal grammar”. If we’re honest we’ll admit that Chomsky does not have enough of a detailed theory of universal grammar to constitute a full coffinload, and do his opponents have solid enough empirical accounts of language acquisition to nail down the lid of such a casket anyway.

It was similarly absurd for the *Chicago Tribune* (10 June 2007) to suggest that Everett’s work is analogous to a high-school physics teacher finding “a hole in the theory of relativity”; but we all know that sort of thing often happens when popular news media try to cover science. Providing better and clearer hype-free accounts of our work to science journalists will be an enduring burden, but one that we all have to shoulder. Calmly, and with some understanding of the fragile and difficult business of popular journalism.

I can well imagine how irksome it has been for Chomsky to see overblown hype about a putatively theory-shaking discovery in the jungle repeated in scores of news sources. But that doesn’t justify the petty spite of his “charlatan” remark to *Folha de S. Paulo* in February 2009, or his assertion that “Daniel Everett’s contributions are basically nothing” in a 2021 video interview.30

Over the past four decades, Everett can be fairly said to have done more for Amazonian linguistics than any other linguist now living. His detailed descriptions of Pirahã and Wari’ are lasting contributions, as is his energetic promotion and encouragement of descriptive work on other Brazilian languages. His basic claim about Pirahã syntax not permitting unbounded sentence length is very probably true. He did not deserve the years of hot-tempered public allegations and insults (or the worse incidents of insult, hate mail, and shouting in his face that he does not publicly report). A sector of our field seems to have lost its moral compass over this issue.

It speaks well of Everett that never in all the years since 2005 has he responded to his tormentors with insults or abuse: he argues points of fact, but he refrains from accusing his enemies of scientific misconduct, devious motives, or self-interested mendacity. For that, and much more, we should salute him.

And as regards the validity of the accusations hurled at him by his many opponents, none of them familiar with the lives and spoken language of the Pirahã, I quote in conclusion the opinion of a young Brazilian anthropologist writing recently about Pirahã culture (*Felizes 2023*: 59):

> A relação de Daniel e Karen Everett com os Pirahã é algo que perdura até aos dias atuais. Durante mais de quarenta anos de convívio – permanente

30https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UBla-h36ywA
ou esporádico – conquistaram a reputação de grandes amigos, de saberem bem a língua, de serem exímios contadores de histórias e de se tornarem importantes aliados, a quem os Pirahã geralmente recorrem para resolver potenciais conflitos ou aprender coisas sobre o mundo dos brancos.

[Daniel and Keren Everett’s relationship with the Pirahã is something that has endured to the present day. During more than forty years of coexistence – permanent or sporadic – they gained the reputation of being great friends, of knowing the language well, of being excellent storytellers and of becoming important allies, to whom the Pirahã often turn to resolve potential conflicts or learn things about the white world.]

That is the view formed by an independent third party with a personal commitment to studying the life of the Pirahã, some who has spent time in Pirahã villages, made the acquaintance of Keren Madora [formerly Everett], and witnessed the consequences of the Everetts’ 46 years of friendship with the Pirahã at first hand.

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