He goes and *I'm like*: The new Quotatives re-visited

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The new quotatives, *like* and *go*, have assumed quite a number of functions outside the quotative frame[1]. So far, all models proposed to explain their polyfunctionality rely on the postulate of unidirectionality in grammaticalization. Based on the findings of Lakoff (1987), this article proposes an alternative model for *like* and shows the importance of a radial functional network for the interpretation of *like* and *go*'s synchronic uses. The functions that the new quotatives have taken on within the quotative paradigm with respect to their use with epistemic stances and mimetic re-enactments will be discussed as well as the priming effects involved in the quotative complex. These findings give evidence that *like* and *go* are not just "picked up" from high status reference groups. They have linguistic as well as social significance and are much more than just pleonastic, intrusive items in the pool of quotatives. Instead, we witness an important division of labor within the paradigm of reporting devices. It will be shown that the functions that *like* and *go* have assumed are best represented with reference to a) a radial structure model and b) a continuum of hypotheticality.

1 A GRAMMATICALIZATION MODEL FOR *LIKE*

Like and *go* convey to the picture that Güldemann (2001) claimed to be typical for quotatives, they are 'notoriously polyfunctional outside the quotative frame'. Concerning *like*, its newly grammaticalized uses, as a discourse marker and a quotative complementizer and their repetitive occurrence and reciprocal attraction have been interpreted as a sign of grammaticalization underway. Quite a few models have been proposed to account for the status quo of *like* (Romaine and Lange 1991, Meehan 1991, Fleischman and Yaguello to appear), all of which rely on the postulate of unidirectionality in grammaticalization. Consider for example Romaine and Lange's (1991) grammaticalization channel based on Traugott's (1982) model.

Figure 1 Romaine and Lange's (1991) Model

PROPOSITIONAL		**TEXTUAL**		**INTERPERSONAL**
PREPOSITION	®	CONJUNCTION	®	DISCOURSE MARKER
prep/ _NP		conj/ _IP		DM/_XP
He looks like my father		Winston tastes good like a cigarette should		They were like people blocking

↓

quotative complementizer

comp/_XP

Maya's like "Kim come over here and be with …."

[1] The corpora I used are the following: The Switchboard Corpus, available through the University of Pennsylvania Data Consortium, with a speaker number of 542 ranging from age 20 to age 60. The speakers were sociolinguistically tagged with respect to educational level and provenance from one of 7 main dialect areas within the US. And the Santa Barbara Corpus of spoken English, also available through the University of Pennsylvania Data Consortium. The speaker number here is 52, age 17 to 70. They were coded with respect to educational level and home state. Overall, my corpus reflects tape recordings from 1988 to 1995.

This model is symptomatic for unidirectional approaches, as it traces the diachronic development of *like*, concentrating on the syntactic development of the marker and trying to link it up with the semantic-pragmatic facts. The authors account for the co-occurrence of *like's* uses and for the fact that its development is not strictly sequential by postulating a branching model. Fleischman and Yaguello (to appear) retrace this model to a multiple pathway model, which shows the close link to the comparative meaning in the metaphorically extended functions. But so far, no model has been able to account for the inter-relatedness and ambiguity of the grammaticalized uses of *like* amongst themselves.
A channel suggests a suppletive development whereas synchronically, we find persistence of meaning. The newer uses of *like* have not supplanted the older ones. A grammaticalization channel, even a branching one, does not account for the overlapping and ambiguity of meaning between functions at opposite ends of the channel.

I will set up an alternative model that can account for the multifunctionality and the overlapping of the *like*s functions. Romaine and Lange (1991:262) themselves propose that a 'network of related meanings' captures best what we find in synchrony. Relying on the concept of a radial structure model (Lakoff 1987), I will trace a semantic field for *like*. I will show that its status quo can best be explained by a structure of linked functions centering around one core and which can be linked with each other more or less closely.
In this article, I will give evidence against a unidirectional account of *like*'s grammaticalization and assume that the same kind of model can also be used to explain *go*'s functions in synchrony. Buchstaller (in preparation) displays how *go*'s development, too, can be understood as a non-suppletive development of multi-layered meanings via functional extensions.

The theoretical background to these claims has been provided by research in the structure of concepts. We have been shown that cognitive structures can be explained in terms of family resemblances (Wittgenstein 1956), prototypes Rosch (1975) etc. The functions of a linguistic item are the sedimentations of the linguistic modeling of the cognitive processes involved in grasping connections and contingencies in the real world (cf. also Black 1999). Consequently, the extensions of a linguistic item are motivated by the relations that speakers perceive between the old and the new item. Given this explanation, linguistic structure is a mirror image of cognitive structure, just as (il-)logical and (un-)objective as human cognition. Overlapping, ambiguity, and polyfunctionality are a function of the underlying cognitive processes such as metaphor, context-induced interpretation, metonymy and are to be considered an outcome of creative language use.
As, by definition, all meanings of a polysemous word are related, it has been argued that they can be considered as linked through a complex network of partially shared commonalties (Lichtenberk 1990), family resemblances (Wittgenstein 1953), or gradual relatedness (Lakoff 1987). This implies that meanings are not unanalyzed wholes but that they are motivated and explicable. Language is a reflection of conceptual manipulation and as concepts are flux, flexible and multiform, the structures resulting in the linguistic system are just as complex as cognitive structures. A radial structure embodies the history of such cognitive semantic-pragmatic developments. They lead to meaning transfers in the linguistic system, where newer functions arise out of linguistic items.

The following figure shows the radial structure of *like*. I will explain the functional extensions and how the are interrelated amongst each other. Note that this chart shows the synchronic semantic field of *like*. It does not make any diachronic claims concerning the grammaticalization of *like*.

Figure 2 The Radial Structure Model of *like*



For historical reasons and because it is the persistent semantic trait, I assume as the basic core meaning of *like* the notion of similarity which is the basic underlying notion of both comparison and approximation. It then gives rise to various other meanings, which can also be considered as interrelated amongst themselves and which still contain its core semantic meaning to a greater or lesser degree.

The overlap between Like and focus

As focus I interpret here, following Underhill (1988) the most significant information in a sentence (cf. also Kuno 1980). Reported speech usually is the most focused part of the narrative. Thus, if *like* co-occurs with quoted material, it focuses on the most significant information in a sentence. The quotation can then be interpreted as a variant of that focus.
Like and *go* often precede interjection, sound effects, or other mimetic enactment of previous events. When speakers include such non- or paralinguistic elements, they perform the reported event rather than merely telling it. The aim of such performances is to create listener involvement and to increase the dramatic impact of the story. Güldemann (2001) claims that *say* and other common speech verbs focus on the semantics, the propositional impact of the quote, which is then not particularly salient. Other, more marked frame elements such as *like* and *go* focus on the presentation. This underlines Blyth et al's (1990) statement that '*be like* may be viewed as a focus quotative, that is a quotative which introduces a particularly salient piece of information packaged in the form of reported speech'.

From a comparison to a quotative

Syntactically, *like* can occupy a slot before a clause or a sentence. If it precedes a quotation, it can take on the syntactic function of an introductory item for reported speech. It can then become associated with its environment; its context of use encroaches upon its interpretation
The mental salience of the link COMPARATIVE MARKER - QUOTATIVE COMPLEMENTIZER has cross-linguistically been sustained by Romaine and Lange (1991) Schourup (1982a: 33-34), and Meyerhoff and Niedzielski (1995, 1998). In other words, if in a number of languages the cognate equivalents of *like* have become discourse introductory items, we have cross-linguistic evidence for a functional correspondence between the functions of this linguistic item.

Like as a hedging/approximative quotative

When quoting, speakers report the utterance, but its form and content can only be rendered approximately because of the idiosyncrasy of expression in terms of suprasegmantals such as accent, style, prosody of the original speaker. The reporting speaker cannot, due to her imperfect memory of the original utterance and due to her personal restrictions concerning voice quality, pitch etc., give an exact rendering of the features of the original speech act. Tannen (1986) takes this into account when she claims that every attempt to quote is actually 'constructed dialogue', as can be seen in the following example:

(1) *Teaching English*[2]

S: I tried to get her to say hello,
and **she'd be like** '(CHOKE)=
C: [@@@@@]
K: [@@@@@]@@@@[@@@@@@@@@@]@@@
S: [no puedo no puedo'].
I'd be like 'yes you can,
just [say 'hello].
K: [@@@@@@]
S: [hello' Annalisa'].
K: [@@@@@@@@@@]
S: '(CHOK[E) (CHOKE)'
K: [@@@@@]
C: [@@@@@]@@@[@@
S: [@ That's what she does,
she gets real embarrassed,
and she just giggles like a goofball.

The content of the quotation can only be an approximative rendering of the whole emotional and contextual situation. Using *like* with its approximative-comparative semantics signals the possible non-equivalence of what is reported and the actual utterance. The speaker retains a reduced responsibility with respect to what was said and how, as a quote introductory *like* does not commit her to the form and the content of the quote. *Like* then functions as a hedge, both on the referential-epistemic, as well as on the interpersonal-pragmatic level.

Like and reported speech and thought

A clear boundary between speech and thought is hard to draw. Especially for first person, it is often impossible to distinguish thought from actual speech (Ferrara and Bell 1995:279). Because of *like's* still more or less inherent semantic comparative-approximative property, it has the possibility of a 'for example' and 'as if' reading. It can then be used to present imaginary discourse as if it took place. Romaine and Lange (1991:227) claim that by using *like* 'the speaker invites the listener to infer that this is what the speaker was thinking OR saying at this very moment'. Consider the following example:

[2] For the transciption conventions of this and the following examples, consider page 19.

(2) *Using plastic grocery bags as lunch-bags*

B: Yeah in fact I have one today,
A: rig[ht.
B: [the only problem with those is sometimes they got holes in the bottom.
A: yeah [they
B: [and @@ **it's like** `whoops there goes my chips,
A: [yeah
B: [okay fine'.
A: uh huh

Rather than the exact words, the quote is rather the expressive content of the speech act or the original speaker's thoughts packaged in the more vivid form of reported speech. Thus, *like* as a quotative can frame direct reported speech and inner monologue.

As shown in the above paragraphs, all uses of *like* still have a semantic trait of comparison / approximation. This is in accordance with Hopper's (1991) principle of the persistence of meaning: *like*'s semantic core meaning is still present in all the derived uses which are linked to each other in various ways. Behind the overlappings and ambiguities that result from *like'*s multifunctionality lies an interrelated net of semantic-pragmatic links around the core semantic property. *Like'*s older uses still persist in the language, the development is additive rather than suppletive.

The proposed radial structure model shows how the superficially messy facts can be linked in an orderly way. The diverse functions that *like* has assumed synchronically are motivated by this model - they cannot be predicted but they are explained. Contrarily to unidirectional accounts, the analysis of the present structure shows that the synchronic functions of linguistic items cannot be fully explained by a chain model but are best understood as a net of relations. My results, which are sustained by much cross-linguistic evidence (cf. Schourup 1982a: 32, Meyerhoff and Niedzielski 1998, 1995, Güldemann 2001, Buchstaller in press), underline the claim put forward against the postulate that grammaticalization paths are always unidirectional (Traugott 1995). I claim that a semantic field model is best able to cope with the linguistic reality.

2 THE HYPOTHETICALITY CONTINUUM

This section explores how, in quoting, speakers index their relationship and attitude towards the quote and express the general probability of the occurrence of the quote. It will be shown how *like, go*, and other quotatives are used to mark the degree of hypotheticality.
Hypotheticality is the probability of the realization of a state of affairs, event, or action. In the case of reported speech, which is the reiteration of words, sounds, and gestures that have already been produced, there is a relationship between the quote and the original utterance. We can distinguish between utterances that could have been spoken out aloud (with various degrees of probability) and those that were spoken out aloud. The question is: How probable is the realization of the actual utterance as an outward, overt speech act?

Comrie (1996) and Akatsuka (1986) propose a hypotheticality continuum instead of an arbitrary division of the epistemic sphere. One pole of this continuum is claimed by factualis, the other by counterfactual. In-between the two poles there are conditional relations of various steps of epistemic stance ranging from hypothetical to possible. The sphere of

probability or hypotheticality is finely differentiated into a multiplicity of epistemic stances, which are differentiated and indicated by various contextual signals. Quotatives, too, can be used with different degrees of hypotheticality.

2.1 Categories of Realization

Within the stream of hypotheticality there are a differentiated set of categories of use of quotations. Since I do not want to arbitrarily divide the epistemicity continuum, I set up my categories of research as follows: One pole is claimed by the realis category. The other pole is claimed by the situational category. The body of the continuum consisting of quotes with various epistemic stances from more to less hypothetical, is taken up by the hypothetical category as explained below[3].

Realis

Realis quotes are real reproductions of past occurring speech acts. When reproduced, they are most frequently embedded in a defined and plausible communicative situation. Such a situation is defined by the contextual factors of speaker, hearer, time, situation….
A quoted realis speech act has been uttered aloud and is subject to response. Consider the following example:

(3) *Being mistaken for a woman*

A: the other day I went into a bar and this guy asked me to dance,
B: @@@ [@@@ @
A: [and all he saw was my hair,
and **he goes** 'do you wanna dance' ?
I turn around and **go** 'what' ?
B @@@@.hhh
A: and **he goes** 'do you wanna dance' ?
I go 'no no'.
he goes 'oh oh I'm sorry'.
I go 'yeah you better be',
[I go 'you better be'.
B: [that's hilarious,

Here, the quotes introduced with *go* are embedded in a real communicative situation, a question and answer scenario. The existence of the second pair part depends on the existence of the first pair part, the quotes can be classified as real speech.

Hypothetical

Ferrara and Bell (1995:279) show that a clear boundary between speech and thought is hard to draw. This is because speakers express their attitude or opinion packaged in the form of reported speech in order to make it more vivid. Thus, it does not make difference whether the quote was uttered aloud or not. We are dealing with quotes whose function is comparable to Goffman's (1981) 'response cries', which are used to 'show or index the mental state of the

[3] Note that there is also habitual, reoccurring reported speech, which I have not included in my discussion here. I will come back to the question of habitual talk later in this paper. I have also excluded cases of purely imagined talk, where i.e. an inanimate entity such as a tree is portrayed as speaking.

transmitters […] to clarify the drama of their circumstances'. Their function is to make inner state available to hearers, as is exemplified by the next stretch of speech:

(4) *Plastic bags*

B: Yeah in fact I have one today,
A: ri[ght.
B: [the only problem with those is sometimes they got holes in the bottom.
A: yeah [they
B: [and @@ **it's like** 'whoops there goes my chips,
A: [yeah
B: [okay fine'.

The above quote is reminiscent of Chafe's (1994) 'verbally uncommitted thought'. Its status as verbal or non-verbal, or even a combination of both, is completely left open. If uttered out aloud, it has the function to put into words (at least in the speaker's and hearer's now) what was going on in the mind of the respective person at the time of the quote. But as Goffman (1981:97) pointed out, with no one present the quote is quite likely to be omitted altogether (cf. also Tannen 1986, Yule and Mathis 1992).

For reasons discussed above, the category *hypothetical* is set up so as to span the whole spectrum of hypotheticality. The other pole of the epistemicity continuum is taken up by the last category:

Situational

Here, we have no communicative situation in the past but in the present, the interlocutors being the current speaker and the current hearer. The moment of speaking is in the deictic now and becomes the quote. There are no past events, no reproduction. The quote can be understood as a comment on the present situation clad in the format of a quote. Consider the following example:

(5) *Cooking*

B: so I enjoy you know cooking thinks to take over to her hou[se or-
A: [oh that is nice,
B: yeah and it is fun for me to do that,
It is something I enjoy doing,
It is funny though **it's like** 'I don't really want to cook for us' @ [@
A: [jeh @@

The above quote is in-between a description of a situation and a quote between the interlocutors in the now. It is often only the added or not added voice effect that helps to distinguish between a description of a situation and a reported quote. *It's like* here can be glossed as *the situation (**it**) is like…. and it is me who is telling you this because I perceive it that way.* The quote indexes a speaker-infused rendering of the situation, it shows that the perspective is that of the current speaker (cf. Sanders and Redecker 1996).

2.2 Comparison between the Quotatives

Having set up a differentiated set of categories of use defined by their epistemic stance, let us comparatively look at how quotatives are used with respect to those categories. The first table shows the frequency of occurrence of the new quotatives *go* and *like* with respect to epistemic stances.

Table1: Distribution of degrees of hypotheticality per quotative

	realis		hypothetical		situational	
	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number
like	22	44	28	56	14	28
go	45	71	17	27	1	2

p <0.001

Table 1 shows that *go* is frequently used for higher probability levels, especially for realis quotes. It is much less frequently employed in the hypothetical category than *like*. In fact, when the hypotheticality category is split up in more (arbitrarily chosen) epistemic stances (not shown here), quotes framed with *go* cluster on the higher end of the epistemic sphere, whereas *like*-framed quotes cluster towards the lower epistemicity end of the scale. This confirms on a smaller scale the results given in this paragraph: *go* as a quotative correlates with higher probability levels. *Go* does not introduce situational quotes, it does not have an equation function between a quote and a situation. This suggests that *go* needs a real communicative situation, if only a hypothetical one.
Like, on the other hand, functions more like a wildcard. It can be used for all probability levels alike (22% for realis, 28% for hypothetical, 14% for situational quotes). By using *like*, speakers do not commit themselves to any epistemic stance at all.

By means of comparison, consider the co-occurrence of *say* and *think* with hypotheticality levels. Note that this table includes also habitual talk. This category cannot be put on the continuum of hypotheticality in the way the categories realis, hypothetical, and situational can. Habitual talk can be split up in habitual realis talk, that is repetitively reoccurring real quoted speech, and habitual hypothetical talk, repetitively reoccurring hypothetical speech. It thus encompasses repeatedly occurring quoted speech with varying degrees of epistemicity. Consider the following table.

Table 2: Distribution of degrees of hypotheticality (in %) per all quotatives

	realis	hypothetical	situational	habitual
say	52	7	10	18
go	45	17	1	28
like	22	28	14	30
think	0	51	38	7

p= 0.001

As expected, *say* is used most frequently with the realis category. The semantics of *say* pin down the quote as to its realization. *Say* spells out that the quote was actually physically uttered out aloud, even though, in real life, it need not have been uttered. The next most frequent quotative to be employed with the realis category is *go*, then *like*, then *think*. As

shown in table 1, out of the new quotatives, *go* is used more for the higher epistemic stances, for quotes in the realis category.
Concerning the hypothetical category, the respective frequencies run up along *say-go-like-think*. *Think* usually refers to attitudes, opinions, points of views, which are rendered as inner monologue but not spoken out aloud. It is the most frequent introductory item for the hypothetical category. *Go* and *like* are in the middle field. They can be used for 'verbally uncommitted thought' and function as a hedge as they do not commit the speaker to the actual occurrence of the speech act in the way *say* does.

The most important finding in table 2 is that *go* and *like* are also very much used to introduce habitual speech. They have the highest frequency overall, 28% and 30% respectively, as opposed to 7% and 18 % for *think* and *say*. Habitual speech is very hard to pin down. If one repeatedly says something, one rarely ever utters exactly the same speech act with the same wording, the same intonational contour etc. Also, with quotes from multiple speakers, the speakers can vary while the message stays the same. Considering this variation in speaker role, instability of production format, and idiolectal specificities of expression, it seems advisable to hedge habitual quotes. Speakers in my corpus introduce habitual or repetitively occurring speech with quotatives that are not necessarily associated with the realis category. The obvious candidates are *go* and *like*, which, as mimesis introductory quotatives, can function as a hedge towards the production format of the quote. *Like*, as well as *go* can occur with hypothetical speech. They do not commit the speakers to the uttering of the quote in the first place. Consequently, table 2 shows the new quotatives have encroached upon this category[4].

3 PRIMING EFFECTS

Tannen (1987) found a general priming effect, and showed that speakers are more likely to use a word that has already occurred in a conversation than a completely 'new' one. This raises the question if a preceding quotative construction or even just a quotative verb has a priming effect on subsequent quotatives (cf. Cameron 1998). The following chapter explores if there are clusters of reciprocal attraction of quotative strategies.

3.1. Speech Verbs and Verbs of Thought

Go and *like* occur with different probability levels. This raises the question if they also co-occur with different surrounds. The following few paragraphs explore contextual effects in a broader perspective: the co-occurrence of *like, go, say*, and *think* with verbs of speech and thought. In the next section, I will then look at the correltation between concrete lexical items.

For this analysis, I adpoted a frame of five turn constructional units[5]. The preceding and following five TCUs of the respective quotative construction were tagged for their

[4] If the habitualis category is split up into more or less arbitrarily chosen epistemic stances, we find that there are slightly more realis habitual quotes framed with *go* and slightly more hypothetical habitual quotes with *like*. Even though these tendencies are not significant, they still underline the general claims made in this article: *like* is used with lower probability levels than *go*, even with repetitively occurring speech.

[5] For the notion of Turn Constructional Unit (TCU) in Conversation Analysis cf. Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974)

surrounding verbs. Note that this section not only explores verbs occurring in quotative frames, but verbs in general. The following table shows whether *like*, *go,* and other quotatives occur more in a context of repetitively occurring thought or speech.

Table 3: Frequency of occurrence (in %) of verbs of speech/thought etc. per quotative

	Speech	thought	ambiguous[6]	no verb[7]
like	22	22	23	33
go	37	10	23	30
say	48	29	5	18
think	19	51	2	28

$p < 0.000$

The results are as follows: *Like* is totally uncommitted concerning the epistemicity of its surround. It can co-occur in the surround of speech, thought, ambiguous verbs or not in a context of repeatedly occurring speech at all. This finding confirms *like's* occurrence as an 'anything goes'-item. It functions as a wildcard, can be used with various hypotheticality levels and does not have many selectional restrictions concerning its surround. This is very probably one of the reasons why it is so frequent. Most often, though, *like* occurs when it is not surrounded by verbs of speech or thought at all (33%).
Go is more associated with realis category, it frames real occurring speech. This correlation is expressed by the fact that *go* is most frequently surrounded by verbs of speech, it occurs in an 'envelope' of speech. Also, *go* often co-occurs with ambiguous or no verbs of speech of thought, a fact that will be explained in the next paragraph.
Say, as a verb that most frequently introduces real occurring speech, is even more frequently surrounded by speech verbs. It co-occurs much less surrounded by ambiguous verbs compared to *go* or *like*. *Think*, the introspective quotative, is mainly surrounded by verbs of thought. We see that introspective quotes are embedded in a context of inner speech.
Overall, looking at the surround of quotes with different enquoting verbs yields the result that they are all surrounded by their counterparts. This is a priming effect in a different, broader sense: the realization of speech in a surround that corresponds to their epistemicity.

3.2. Birds of a Feather

The 'Birds of a Feather Effect' has been defined by Scherre and Naro (1991, 1992) as 'birds of a feather flock together'. The following paragraph investigates first, on a more abstract level, if there is such a birds of a feather effect amongst English quotative strategies as has been shown by Cameron (1998) for Spanish. Then, more concretely, it explores lexical priming effects with quotative verbs. Each quotative strategy was analyzed with respect to the preceding instance of a reported speech strategy within the previous five turns. The results are seen in table 4 below:

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[6] As aambiguous I tagged verbs that are ambiguous as between a verb of speech or a verb of thought, here mainly *like* and *go* as quotatives but also verbs like *pondered*, *reflected*….that can signal inner as well as outward monologue.
[7] No verb stands for no verb of speech or thought. Within the 5 turns preceding and following the turn in question there was no other verb of speech or thought. This category includes but consists not only of verbless quotation frames as these are not overtly marked with respect to their verbal realization.

Table 4: Frequency of occurrence of quotative strategy per quotative

	Quotative verb		unframed		no verb	
	%	value	%	value	%	value
like	49	0.431	3	0.377	57	0.588
go	56	0.588	5	0.623	38	0.412

p< 0.001 log likelihood: -255.032 χ2: 13.39 (df 2)

This chart is to be read as follows: The percentages are the frequency of occurrence of a quoting strategy before *like* or *go* in quotative function. Thus 49 % of the quotations before a *like*-quotation frame are framed with a quotative verb, 3% are unframed quotations etc. The percentages can be read horizontally, roughly sum up to 100%, and show which factors favor the occurrence of *like* or *go.*
The factor values are probabilistic weights created by the VABRUL program and represent the values for a quotative strategy to occur before *like* or *go*. The values tell us if a new quotative (that is *like* or *go*) is employed as an enquoting strategy, which factors favor which quotative with which strength. The factor values can be read vertically and sum up to one. A favoring effect of a constraint is indicated by values above 0.5, a disfavoring one by values under 0.5.

We can read from this chart that both new quotatives co-occur quite frequently without a context of repetitively occurring quoted speech, 57% and 38% respectively. No quotatives favor the occurrence of *like*. In contrast, *go* more frequently follows framed quotes. This finding underlines what has been stated above: *go* usually occurs within a communicative situation, if only a hypothetical one. As the very low percentages for both suggest, unframed quotes do not usually co-occur with quotes with go and like.

The more abstract, higher level effects suggest that there are priming effects with respect to quotative strategies. The following paragraph explores if one level down, on a more concrete note, there are patterns of priming as well. When we split up the category of quotative verbs into the lexical items we find the following concrete lexical priming effect:

Table 5: Frequency of Occurrence of Verbs of Speech/Thought etc. per Quotative

	like		go		say		think	
	%	value	%	value	%	value	%	value
like	13	0.886	3	0.144	14	0.305	9	0.654
go	2	0.114	20	0.856	30	0.695	4	0.346

p< 0.001 χ2: 60.024 (df 5)

Table 5 shows that there is a very strong lexical priming effect for *go* and *like*. There seems to be much mutual attraction between quotes framed by *go* and *like*, as they tend to come in clusters. But notice that, in contrast to the reciprocal attraction of *go* and like amongst themselves, they seem to extremely disfavor one another. *Like* and *go* do not co-occur, at least not frequently immediately next to each other. Overall, the birds of a feather effect holds that the new quotatives favor the occurrence of the new quotatives with 16% for *like* and 22% for *go*. But if we split up this category, we see that the effect is lexical and not categorical.

Like is less frequently occurring after *say* than *go*. As has been shown above, it occurs most often after no quoted speech at all, the contextual category "no verb". *Go*, as an item most heavily used for real occurring quotes, is found most frequently in situations where real occurring quoted speech is already present (table 3). Table 5 shows that *say* and *go* frequently co-occur. Speakers in my corpus used the alternation of *go* and *say* in order to demarcate speaker roles. Let me illustrate this with an example:

(6) *Picking lemons*

M: and *I said* 'hi can I help you' ?
P: @@[@@@]
M: [you know]?
and **she goes**,
and I- you know,
of course it's this long drive,
so I - I probably look like ... total hell,
P: right.
M: and **she goes** 'oh,
um I was just getting ... some lemons'.
P: @@@[@@@]
M: [and *I said*] 'oh yeah ?
who are you' ?
P: @@[@@]
M: [and **she] goes** 'oh,
I'm your next door neighbor'.
P: @@@[@@]

Example (6) shows that the roles of 1st person sg. and 3rd person sg. can be differentiated not only by the pronouns, but also by the tense and the verb of quotation. The co-occurrence of *go* and *say* in exactly this alternation pattern, *go* (in **boldface**) used in the present tense and for 3rd person sg. and *say* (in *italics*) in the past tense used for self is quite frequent in my data. As table 6 demonstrates, this effect does not seem to occur with *like*, at least not as regularly.

Table 6: Co-occurrence of *go* and *like* with preceding and following *say*

	N	%
say-go-say	22 / 186	12
say-like-say	3 / 238	1

Clusters of the sequence go-say-go occur with a frequency of 12% in my data, and these are only the examples within the five concurrent uninterrupted[8] turns. As has been displayed by (6) above, the demarcation of speaker role is a function that *go* has taken up via the alternation with say.

Looking at the contingencies and occurrences of reciprocal attraction that stretch over three or more items, we find that *go* has a stronger lexical priming effect than *like* amongst itself.

[8] Uninterrupted here implies without any other intermittent quotative strategy such as unframed quotes, or other quotative frames.

The table below shows the frequency of occurrence of three directly subsequent lexically identically framed quotes.

Table 7: Adjacent triple occurrence of quotative devices

	N	%
Go-go-go	21 / 186	11
Like-like-like	8 / 238	3

Go has a stronger priming effect amongst itself, it has a stronger capacity to cluster. Even though this is only a tendency with no statistical significance, we can state a stronger reciprocal lexical large-scale attraction, a stronger lexical priming effect with *go*.

4. THE CO-OCCURRENCE WITH MIMETIC PERFORMANCES

The notion of mimesis can be traced back to Plato (Book III the Republic). It has been taken up by Goffman (1981), Wierzbicka (1974) in her 'quotations as performance' approach and more recently by Clark and Gerrig (1990). In this approach, quotes are regarded as demonstrations, quoting is 'playing someone's part'. The enquoting person 'does not say what the content of the quote is (i.e. what was said), instead he does something that enables the hearer to SEE for himself what it is, that is to say, in a way, he *shows* this content' (Clark and Gerrig 1990:802).
Extreme mimesis is direct representation, total imitation of the event, we only hear the reportees voice. Extreme diegesis is summarized representation, pure reporting of the event through the reporters voice. They are claimed to exist in their purest form in direct and indirect discourse respectively. Consequently, the difference between direct and indirect discourse is then between showing and describing, between mimesis and diegesis, or dramatic vs. descriptive, between reporting the 'how' and the 'what' of the original speech act.
But even though the claim that those modes of representation are to be fundamentally kept apart holds in theory, in every day talk-in-interaction the boundaries between them are flux and creatively exploited by speakers. Pure direct reported discourse is a hybrid form of rendering past speech events as direct speech can incorporate 'delivery aspects' (Clark and Gerrig 1990), such as voice effects, gestures, inarticaluate sounds or even consist entirely of them[9]. The two modes of quoting can thus be considered as two scalar perspectives on a continuum. (Yule 1993:236, cf. Güldemann 2001)

The following paragraphs discuss the co-occurrence of quotative verbs with mimetic enactment. Coded as mimesis were all aspects of mimetic enactment to be revealed on an auditive or contextual basis. This implied voice and sound effects of all sorts, and gestures, where they could be retrieved from audience reactions.

[9] The incorporation of mimetic performances is done mainly for three reasons: to convey a more emotion-based rather than factual mode of rendering. This reveals how the speakers felt in and perceived the situation. To add more vividness and thus to create involvement (Blyth 1991). And to add internal evaluation without having to step outside the quotation frame (Labov 1972).

Table 8: Co-occurrence of quotatives with sound effects

mimesis	%	Number
go	76	132
like	69	159
say	42	50
think	20	21

$p<0.001$ $\chi 2$: 110.634 (df 3)

Table 8 yields the following conclusions: The verb *go* is commonly most frequently used to enquote mimetic enactment. (Butters 1980, Schourup 1982a, Tannen 1986, Yule and Mathis 1992). But *like* is nearly as often used for enquoting mimetic performances. The difference between *like* and *go* is not statistically significant, both can be used to enquote sounds.
The most frequent dialogue introducer *say* is used half of the time with mimetic performances. *Think* is even less co-occurring with mimesis. This is quite surprising in the light of the fact that *think* enquotes inner monologue, opinion, attitude and point-of-view. Hypothetical speech such as evaluation, attitudes, etc. is often high in emotion (cf Chafe 1994) and hypothetical speech acts very frequently embody voice or sound effects (cf. Buchstaller in preparation). This is because mimetic enactment has concentrated semantic reference and inner speech is often clad in a more expressive form than only words. According to Goffmann (1981), these categories should be expressed via 'response cries'.

But as my data suggests, when hypothetical speech is enquoted by *think*, it is often not accompanied by sound effects. A possible explanation for this finding is that *think* often frames situational quotes, a category with little voice effect. This is due to the fact that there is no original speech act to be rendered. As a reminder, a situational quote depends on the here and now, the context of the quote between the current speaker and the current hearer. The choice whether or not to incorporate a mimetic performance is the same as for the original speech act, but there is no **re**-enactment. Thus, a whole time axis of voice / sound effects (the reporting of sounds,.. which were originally produced) that could be reported, is missing.
This explanation might partly account for the finding that *think* does not occur frequently with sound or voice effects. But as a full 51% (cf. table 2) of the quotes framed with *think* are used for the hypothetical category, whereas only 20% (table 7) of all *think*-quotes co-occur with mimetic enactment, this explanation is not sufficient as to why inner speech framed with *think* is not often accompanied by sounds etc.
This is where the second explanation comes in: *Think* spells out that the speech act is inward, not uttered out aloud, not interactively realized. This is in contrast to quotatives such as *like* and *go*, which leave the question of the original speech event's production entirely open. My claim is that speakers using *go* and *like* play with this indeterminacy between speech and thought. They exploit the fact that the new quotatives operate in the moot point between real occurring and hypothetical speech. Using the new quotatives, speakers quote as if they were reproducing a real speech act but package it in a more expressive form, in sound and voice effects. This suggests that speakers take advantage of the full creative possibilities the language offers them in the new quotatives: a stream of consciousness-like displayal of inner states and attitudes realized in vivid, immediate speech. *Like* and *go* have introduced this quotative style into the spoken language. It now fills a space within the spectrum of poetic formulae of the spoken register, where indirect free speech, commonly used in writing, is not an option (Chafe 1994, Romaine and Lange 1991) and where the theatrical topos of soliloquy

did not take on (Ferrara and Bell 1995). Contrarily to *think*, *like* and *go* theatricalize inner speech by outwardly displaying it in vivid, emotionally heightened output. And in contrast to *say*, they do not pin down a quote as to its hypotheticality level.

The newly grammaticalized quotatives *go* and *like* are distinguished from the old quotatives *say* and *think* by their function as mimesis markers. Following the lines of Güldemann (2001) and Yule and Mathis (1992), we can claim that in US English, *say* and *think* foreground the semantics, the propositional content of the (inner) quote. *Be like* and *go,* the newcomers in the quotative complex and still more marked constructions highlight the 'how', the demonstrative-enacted side of the material.

5. CONCLUSION

In this article I tried to show how *like*'s synchronically occurring functions can be explained with reference to a semantic core model. Elsewhere (Buchstaller in preparation), I show that a radial structure model can also explain the status quo of *go*'s functions. The grammaticalization of the new quotative verbs does not proceed unilaterally. Their development does not progress step-by-step, but within a synsemantic field of mutually overlapping and reciprocally reinforcing functions. This is underlined by Güldemann's (2001) findings that quotative items are notoriously polyfunctional outside the quotative frame.

I have displayed how *like* and *go* are synchronically used as quotative items. With respect to the expression of epistemic stances, it has been argued that they are both heavily used for the expression of habitual talk and that *go* has a bigger affiliation with higher probability levels. Looking at priming and 'birds of a feather' effects, it has been shown that there are strong priming effects and that the alternation between *say* and *go* is used to demarcate speaker roles. With respect to the enquoting of sounds and other mimetic performances, my findings underline the use of the new quotatives as mimesis markers in contrast to the old quotative devices.

Thus, *like* and *go* are not vacuous, taken over for purely social and stylistic reasons and because they are cool, as has been suggested by much of the variationist literature to date. The enlargement within the pool of quotative constructions is not simply that of two intrusive pleonastic items edging their way into a stable paradigm. But the new quotatives have their justified place amongst the quotative devices. They have taken on quite novel functions with respect to mimetic enactments, the marking of epistemicity, and speaker role demarcation. This is an important finding, as it shows the division of labor amongst the quotative devices. *Go* and *like* have functional and social significance.

I have shown that the fact that *like* and *go* convey linguistic information is best represented and understood by

a semantic field model, as it accounts for the persistence of *like's* (and *go*'s) functions. Their polyfunctionality can be explained as well as their applicability to exactly the functions they have taken on inside the paradigm of quotative devices.

a hypotheticality continuum. We need to be able to understand how quotes can be used with different epistemic stances and how quotative items functions with respect to probability levels.

This is the basis we need in order to be able to show how speakers index how they feel towards the quote, how they want to re-enact and represent the enquoted material, and how they index their commitment to the epistemic stance of the quote.

Appendix: Transcription Conventions

carriage return	intonation unit
[ ]	overlap
=	quick, immediate connection of new turns or single units
(.)	micro-pause
(-), (--)	short, middle pause
::::	lengthening, according to its duration
?	high rise, appeal intonation
,	mid rise, continuing intonation
.	low fall, final intonation
( )	unintelligible passage, according to its duration
accent	primary or main accent
!ac!cent	extra strong accent
↑	pitch step up
↓	pitch step down
‘ ‘	signals for start and end of quote
@	laughter

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