Towards an evolutionarily plausible theory of language: the case against minimalism

Anna Parker

“[T]he Minimalist Program...is...a research program concerned with...determining the answers to...the question “How `perfect’ is language?”” (Chomsky 1995:221)

Seeking out perfection in the design of language is just one of the many ways in which the linguist can hope to constrain the set of possible theories of the system. The question is whether this is the right approach to take. From an evolutionary perspective, the answer must be no. Theorising in the minimalist framework assumes a highly atomic, undecomposable system of language which is incongruous with adaptationist evolutionary thinking on its origin. A system which is 'perfect' in the sense of the Minimalist Program cannot arise through the adaptive process of natural selection - the explanation par excellence in biology for complex adaptive systems - but instead can only be given a saltational account. The conception of language in minimalist terms flies in the face of evidence on what is evolvable. It precludes the assumptions of gradualism, constraints on optimisation (Dawkins 1982), and sources of imperfections (Cain 1989) maintained in evolutionary biology. Language is grounded in biology, and so its evolution cannot be antithetic to that of other biological capacities. Our theory of language must be fully reconcilable with the fundamentals of evolution. This paper will examine the causes of the incompatiblity between the minimalists' means of constraining the theory of language, and the evolutionary account of the faculty. It will further suggest the steps that need to be taken to develop an evolutionarily plausible theory of language.